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Abstract 
Credit Constraints and Impact on Rural Farm Household Welfare: The case of 
Vietnam’s North Central Coast region 
by 
My Minh Chau Tran 
 
This study aims to identify the factors affecting formal credit constraint status of rural farm 
households in Vietnam and their impact on the household welfare. Despite the effort of the 
subsidised financial institutions to expand their credit coverage to almost every rural Vietnam 
communes, rural farm households are found to remain credit constrained by these institutions. 
Using the Direct Elicitation Method, our survey uncovers more than 40% of the rural farm 
households in Vietnam’s North Central Coast region are credit constrained by formal financial 
institutions. Quantity constraint accounts for the highest proportion of these cases, followed by 
transaction cost constraint. No case of risk constraint is reported.  
The empirical evidences reveal that young and less educated households with female head are less 
likely to receive sufficient loan from the formal financial institutions. Similarly, farm land size, 
labour resources and non-farm income play important roles to relax household’s credit constraint 
status. The findings also raise the concern that subsidised credit allocation favours better off 
households but farm households in wealthier areas have disadvantages to obtain subsidised 
credit. The maximum loan size offered by the formal financial institutions is still lower than the 
household’s actual credit demand. Further, our results clearly show that credit constraints have 
negative impact on the household welfare in the North Central Coast region and this impact can 
be alleviated by informal credit. 
With regards to implications, our results recommend that apart from enhancing credit allocation 
regime, the government should focus on improving the households’ education and developing 
non-farm economic activities in the rural area, which not only ease formal credit restriction but 
also promote household welfare. It is also important that policy makers and formal financial 
institutions pay more attention on developing relevant credit policies for the poor and 
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disadvantaged households in lower poverty rate communities to assure that they receive sufficient 
loan for production and consumption. The loan size limit set by Vietnam Bank for Social Policies 
needs to match with the actual households’ credit demand. Relaxing credit constraints is essential 
not only to enhance the household welfare but also narrow the welfare gap between the poor and 
non-poor households. The substitute effect of informal credit on the household welfare supports 
the idea of integrating the two credit sectors into one well-functioning credit market.  
 
Keywords: credit constraints, determinants, rural farm households, North Central Coast, welfare 
impact 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
Rural credit plays a key role in poverty alleviation programs in developing countries. According to 
Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2008), the improvement of rural household’s accessibility to credit is 
more efficient to resolve growth stagnation and perpetual income inequality than fiscal 
redistribution as it equalizes earning opportunity while it does not reduce work and savings 
motivation. However, without the intervention from the government, rural households are usually 
excluded by formal financial institutions due to high transaction cost and asymmetry information 
(Hoff & Stiglitz, 1990; Jaffee & Stiglitz, 1989). In addition, lack of collateral, weak credit contract 
enforcement and underdevelopment of insurance service discourage formal creditors to serve this 
market (Ghosh, Mookherjee, & Ray, 2000). Low interest rate credit provided by subsidised 
financial institutions is a solution applied by many developing countries to extend credit to farmers 
in rural area. However, this policy was criticized for distorting the rural financial market and failing 
to reach most needy and vulnerable groups as well as exacerbates income inequality (Amin, Rai, & 
Topa, 2003; Conning & Udry, 2007; Meyer & Nagarajan, 2000; Tsai, 2004). Thus, many poor and 
small farm households are still constrained from formal credit regardless of how intensive and 
broad government interventions have been. Credit constraints have serious impact on household 
welfare and production. Guirkinger & Boucher (2008) indicates that credit constraints negatively 
affect resource allocation, particularly agricultural productivity of Peruvian farm households and 
the removal of constraints can increase agricultural production in the studied area by 26%. Similar 
conclusion can be found in Dong, Lu, and Featherstone (2012) study. Li and Zhi’s (2010) study 
reveals the negative impact of credit constraints on rural household income and consumption 
expenditure in China. 
Vietnam has a high proportion of rural population. At the end of 2011, approximately 68% of 
Vietnam population lived in the rural area (GSO, 2012b), in which 67.83% of the households was 
mainly attached to farming. The poverty rate in the rural area is much higher than the urban area 
(14% compared to 3% (GSO, 2012b)). As savings in rural Vietnam is low (average 6.7 million 
Vietnam dong (VND) per household annually (GSO, 2012a)), credit is considered to be an essential 
resource to improve farm household welfare and production. However, similar to many 
developing countries, Vietnam rural farm households are ruled out by formal financial institutions. 
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In order to meet credit demand of rural households at affordable interest rate, the government 
subsidises formal credit supply through three organisations, namely the Vietnam Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD), Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP) and People’s 
Credit Funds (PCFs). In spite of the government’s effort to expand subsidised credit institutions 
rapidly in recent years with the aim to combat poverty, many rural farm households are still 
constrained from formal credit and forced to borrow from informal lenders (Barslund & Tarp, 
2008; Dufhues & Buchenrieder, 2005; Nguyen, 2008; Pham & Izumida, 2002).  
Despite the importance of formal credit to rural farm household outcomes in Vietnam, there are 
limited studies that address the determinants of credit constraints and their impacts. To the best 
of our knowledge, there has been no study evaluating the impact of credit constraints on rural 
farm household welfare particularly in Vietnam. In addition, the studies related to credit 
constraints only considered full quantity rationing (households apply for the loan and then are 
rejected), omitting the case of partly quantity rationing (loan obtained by the borrowers is less 
than their demand) and self-rationing.  
1.2. North Central Coast region  
North Central Coast (NCC) is one of the seven regions in Vietnam located in the middle of the 
country. The region comprises of six provinces Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, Quang 
Tri, Thua Thien Hue. It is one of the regions with the highest poverty rate in Vietnam. NCC’s 
percentage of poor households is only lower than Northern Midland and Mountain region which 
face inherent difficulties in social and economic development (mountainous geography and high 
proportion of ethnic minorities).  
Table 1.1 Poverty Rate by Region in Vietnam 2006 – 2010 
 
 
 
Region 2006 2008 2010 
Red River Delta 10 8.6 8.3 
Northern Midland and Mountain 27.5 25.1 29.4 
North Central Coast 26.6 23.1 24 
South Central Coast 17.2 14.7 16.9 
Central Highlands 24 21 22.2 
South East 4.6 3.7 3.4 
Mekong River Delta 13 11.4 12.6 
Whole country 15.5 13.4 14.2 
Source: Adapted from (GSO, 2011) 
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It can be seen from Table 1.1, compared to other low land regions such as the Red River Delta, 
South Central Coast or Mekong River Delta, NCC has much higher poverty rate. Majority of NCC’s 
population inhabits in rural area. According to GSO (2012b) in 2011, rural population accounted 
for 81.83% of the region’s total population while the average rate of the country as a whole was 
only 68.25% (see Table 1.2 for details).   
Table 1.2       Percentage of Rural Population by Region 
 Source: Adapted from (GSO, 2012b) 
Although there was a significant increase in NCC’s monthly income per capita over the year, it still 
lagged behind other regions.  As illustrated in Table 1.3, NCC’s income per capita was significantly 
lower than Northern Midland and Mountain and only equal to 65.1% of the average income per 
capita of the whole country, lagged far behind Red River Delta, South East and Mekong River 
Delta.  
Table 1.3      Monthly Income per capita by region 
Unit: VND 1000 
Source: Adapted from (GSO, 2012b) 
Relatively low income per capita can be explained by high rate of labour being engaged in farm 
employment. For example, 63.8% of NCC’s labour force worked in agricultural sector, which is 
Region 2008 2010 2011 
Red River Delta 71.32 69.6 69.1 
Northern Midland and Mountain 84.08 83.52 83.07 
North Central Coast 84.55 83.06 81.83 
South Central Coast 67.02 65.44 64.54 
Central Highlands 72.40 71.44 71.12 
South East 42.81 42.72 39.12 
Mekong River Delta 78.46 76.43 75.72 
Whole country 71.01 69.50 68.25 
Region 2008 2010 
Red River Delta 1048.5 1567.8 
Northern Midland and Mountain 657 905 
North Central Coast 641.1 902.8 
South Central Coast 843.3 1162.1 
Central Highlands 794.6 1087.9 
South East 1649.2 2165 
Mekong River Delta 939.9 1247.2 
Whole country 995.2 1387.1 
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significantly high in comparison with 28.8% of Red River Delta, 42.7% of South Central Coast or 
49.2% of Mekong River Delta (GSO, 2011). Furthermore, farming was the main economic activity 
of 70.2% of the rural households in NCC.  
It should be emphasised that NCC is frequently threatened by natural disasters.  As calculated by 
Noy and Vu (2010), from 1996 to 2005, there were 125 natural disasters observed directly 
affecting this region. The total damage caused by natural disasters to North Central Coast 
accounted for 11.85% of regional GDP which is worse than any other areas in Vietnam. Strong 
dependence on farming is a reason why this area is economically vulnerable to natural disasters. It 
also explains why NCC’s is the lowest income per capita region in Vietnam.   
It is assumed that the improvement of accessibility to credit can increase income and improve 
consumption for rural farm households in Vietnam. For the regions which have high poverty rate, 
high rural population, are significantly dependent on farm income and exposed to natural disasters 
like NCC, credit is a remedy to reduce poverty and enhance rural farm household welfare.  In order 
to make formal credit more reachable for rural farm households in this area, it is important to 
identify their credit constraint condition, factors determining their credit constraint status and its 
impact on their welfare.  
1.3. Research objectives 
This study aims to identify the factors determining farm household’s credit constraint status in 
rural North Central Coast region of Vietnam. The study also examines the impact of credit 
constraints on farm household welfare in the studied region. Results from the study are expected 
to show the extend subsidised credit penetrates rural farm households in NCC, which is considered 
to be one of the poorest regions in Vietnam and whether there is any difference in welfare 
between those who are credit constrained and unconstrained. 
The specific objectives of this study include: 
1.      To provide an overview of Vietnam rural credit market and credit constraints  
2.      To identify the factors affecting household’s access to formal credit in Vietnam rural market  
3.      To evaluate the effects of credit constraints on rural farm household welfare  
1.4. Significance of the study 
This is the first study to address different types of credit constraint on farm households and their 
determinants in rural Vietnam. Previous studies (Boucher, Carter, & Guirkinger, 2008; Guirkinger & 
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Boucher, 2008) have showed that failure to take into account all types of credit constraint leads to 
under-representation of rural credit demand as well as credit constraint condition. Results from 
this study help to answer the question - when the price constraint eases (low interest rates), what 
other constraints affect farm households to access formal credit. Another contribution of the 
study is to measure the impact of credit constraints on rural farm household welfare in Vietnam, 
which has not been discussed in previous studies. If the impact is significant, then an adjustment 
of the government policy on rural credit for farm households is necessary to improve their welfare.  
1.5. Structure of the study 
Chapter One introduces the research which includes rationale, research purpose, research 
objectives, significance of the study and background information of rural poverty and 
development in Vietnam. An overview of the rural credit market and related literature are 
presented in Chapter Two. Chapter Three presents the research methods. Descriptive data and 
results from the empirical models are discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 summarises the major 
findings, proposes policy implications, highlights limitation of the research and provides 
recommendations for future studies.  
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Chapter 2 
Review of related literature 
Section 2.1 provides an overview of Vietnam rural credit market, followed by the characteristics of 
credit market suppliers. In addition, literatures related to credit constraints, such as definition, 
causes and determinants of credit constraints are discussed in section 2.2. Results from previous 
studies on impact of credit constraints on farm households are also discussed in this section. The 
final section provides a summary of the review.  
2.1. Overview of Vietnam rural credit market 
Like other developing countries, Vietnam rural credit market is featured by fragmented lenders 
coexisting namely formal, semi-formal and informal credit providers (see Figure 2.1) (Ho, 2004; 
Nguyen, 2007; Pham & Izumida, 2002; Pham & Lensink, 2007)  
 
Source: Adapted from (ADB, 2010) 
Informal 
 
Semi-formal 
 
Formal 
 
Credit providers to 
rural households 
 
ROSCAS 
 
Relative 
& friends 
 
Money 
Lender 
Marketing 
Agent 
Small 
Traders 
Pawn 
Shops 
Licensed 
MFIs 
 
NGOs 
 
PCFs 
 
VBSP 
 
SOBs 
 
Input 
Suppliers 
Figure 2.1 Structure of credit system for rural households 
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Each lender imposes different rate of interest and contract terms as well as serves for specific 
borrowing purposes.  By 1993, informal lenders dominated about 73% of the rural credit market in 
Vietnam. The establishment of People Credit Funds (PCFs) in 1993 and the Vietnam Bank for the 
Poor (VBP) under the administration of Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(VBARD) in 1995 was the turning point for the expansion of the formal credit sector, which led to 
the contraction of informal credit sector’s market share to 51% (McCarty, 2001). Another factor 
that contributed to the prevalence of formal over informal lenders in the rural credit market was 
the transformation of Vietnam Bank for Social and Policies (VBSP) from Vietnam Bank for the Poor 
in 2002. At the end of 2008, formal lenders apparently dominated over informal counterparts (see 
Table 2.1 for more details). Formal credit providers are highly subsidised by the government 
because of high transaction cost and high risk that exclude commercial financial institutions from 
the rural market (Barslund & Tarp, 2008; Nguyen, 2007).  The semi-formal credit sector is in the 
development stage and is gradually legalised, but, plays a modest role in credit provision (ADB, 
2010). Relatives and friends are still important informal credit sources for rural households (see 
Table 2.1). 
 Table 2.1      Percentage of households borrowing or having debt in the past 12 months by 
source of loan and areas 
Year Area Total VBSP VBARD Other bank 
Political & 
social 
organisation 
Private 
money 
lender 
Relative/ 
friend Others
* 
2004 
Urban 
27.7 9.4 33.7 8.3 6.7 11.5 32.5 4.4 
2006 27.5 17.8 31.6 9.6 8.6 9.0 25.5 4.0 
2008 26.6 23 28.3 9.9 7.4 8.5 29.5 3.6 
2004 
Rural 
41.7 12 48.6 2.9 6.2 11.1 24.8 3.1 
2006 41.6 20.4 46.7 2.5 7.4 8.1 21.4 2.4 
2008 41.2 31 37.6 3.0 6.7 8.6 24.6 2.6 
Note: * means other informal credit sources in rural area 
Source: Adapted from (GSO, 2009) 
Results from the Vietnam Household Living Standards survey (GSO, 2009) show the substantial 
dependence of rural households on credit. In 2008, 41.2% of rural households was in debt whereas 
the proportion of indebted urban households was 26.6%. Particularly, rural households were more 
reliant on formal lenders, especially VBSP and VBARD while relatives and friends became one of 
the main credit sources of their urban counterparts. In addition, 9.9% of urban households 
compared to 3% of rural households accessed other bank’s credit, exhibiting the disadvantage of 
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rural households to approach to other formal sources of credit rather than subsidised ones (see 
Table 2.2).   
Table 2.2      Percentage of poor households selected by localities borrowing or having debt by 
source of loan in rural area 
Year Rural area VBSP VBARD 
Other 
bank 
Political & 
social 
organisation 
Private 
money 
lender 
Relative/ 
friend Others
* 
2005 53.9 53 20.1 0.8 8.3 9.3 26 3.2 
2006 54.8 53.8 20.4 0.8 7.7 9.5 26.1 3.1 
2007 55.1 55.1 19.7 0.6 7.9 9.7 25.9 3.3 
Note: * means other informal credit sources in rural area 
Source: Adapted from (GSO, 2009) 
 
Table 2.3       Average amount of outstanding debts per household borrowing or having debts in 
the past 12 months by sources of loan and regions 
Year Area Total VBSP VBARD Other bank 
Political & 
social 
organisation 
Private 
money 
lender 
Relative/ 
friend Others
 * 
2006 
Urban 
36,032 5,980 44,821 121,733 4,629 13,598 25,822 8,180 
2008 47,936 8,251 46,503 163,598 6,321 28,500 25,904 28,684 
2006 
Rural 
12,010 5,567 14,791 31,824 4,092 7,277 8,314 5,647 
2008 18,383 7,754 22,891 56,790 5,737 10,530 13,129 7,708 
Note: * means other informal credit sources in rural area 
Unit: VND 1000 
Source: Adapted from (GSO, 2009) 
 
In terms of loan size, Table 2.3 shows average loan size offered by unsubsidised commercial banks 
was substantially bigger than subsidised credit institutions. It is understandable since commercial 
banks prefer to serve big customers with high value transaction to reduce transaction cost. The 
loan size provided by VBSP is relatively small compared to other sources, but there is no difference 
in terms of loan size between urban and rural customers, which implies that loan amount offered 
by the bank is regulated by the policy rather than based on actual demand.    
2.1.1. Formal lenders 
Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, Vietnam Bank for Social and Policies and 
People Credit Funds are main suppliers in the rural formal credit market. Although these 
institutions are under the support of the government, there are differences in their borrowing 
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policies, procedure, interest rate and collateral requirement. It is important to note that while 
VBARD and VBSP are available in almost every communes, PCFs only can be found in specific 
areas.  
a) The Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) 
VBARD is the first commercial bank providing credit to households in rural area. It is also the only 
bank offering both commercial and preferential loans to rural households. Although separated 
from Vietnam Bank for the Poor (later renamed as Vietnam Bank for Social Policies) in 2002, 
VBARD still pursues the poverty reduction objective and has its own lending policy for rural farm 
households, which is neither as strict as other commercial banks nor as easy as VBSP. Despite the 
fact that the proportion of borrowers served by VBARD has decreased over the years, it is still the 
biggest lender in the rural area. However, the proportion of poor households receiving loan from 
VBARD is much lower than that from VBSP (19.7% compared to 55.1%) (see Table 2.2). In terms of 
loan size, loan amounts offered by VBARD are much larger than those offered by VBSP (see Table 
2.3). There is no limitation on VBARD’s loan whereas the maximum amount a borrower can 
receive from VBSP is VND 30 million. However, the average loan amount obtained by urban 
households from VBARD is relatively larger than that of rural households.  According to the decree 
41/ND-CP/2010, banks are allowed to lend a maximum of VND 50 million to farm households 
without collateral requirement. In return, households have to present their land title certificate to 
the credit institutions. As commented by Putzeys (2002) the loan application procedure and 
evaluation of VBARD are complicated, which implies high transaction cost for both borrowers and 
the bank when small sized loans are processed. Therefore, the bank would prefer to serve large 
borrowers.  
b) Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP) 
Among the three main formal credit institutions, VBSP is the biggest loan provider to rural poor 
households. The bank was transformed from Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP) established in 1995 
and operated under the administration of VBARD. The purpose of separating VBSP from VBARD is 
to enhance the banks’ capacity in implementing social policies assigned by the government. VBSP 
has developed rapidly in terms of commune coverage and the number of borrowers served. In 
2004, only 12% of rural households obtained loan from VBSP, this increased to 31% in 2008 (see 
Table 2.1). Up to the end of 2009, the bank has reached 99% of total communes and covered 7.54 
million borrowers, becoming the prevailing lender in rural areas (ADB, 2010). It is also the 
predominant creditor for the rural poor with a market share of 55.1 % in 2007 (see Table 2.2).  
 9 
Although the poor is the target group of VBSP but the proportion of poor households in the bank’s 
borrower pool was only 32.9% in 2004 (Nguyen, 2008). According to VBSP’s loan distribution plan, 
this number was 39.8% in 2010 (ADB, 2010). In general, the biggest bank for the poor only covered 
12% of poor households in rural areas (Nguyen, 2008). The reason for the low coverage is that 
apart from serving poor households, VSPB has to support 13 other governmental programs such as 
supporting disadvantageous students, clean water and rural sanitation and job creation. The 
difference between the poverty definition of World Bank and VBSP is another explanation for the 
low coverage (Nguyen, 2008). The poor recognised by VBSP are those who meet the criteria 
regulated by the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) and are certified by local 
authorities. Therefore, some households who are certified to be poor by local authorities are not 
recognised as poor according to the World Bank’s definition and vice versa.  Furthermore, 
although VBSP was established to support the poor to access credit, it is also under pressure over 
the repayment requirement. In other words, if a VBSP branch bank has a high rate of overdue 
loans, financial support from the government for that branch bank would be contracted, then the 
poorest are more likely to be excluded (Nguyen, 2008). In terms of interest rate and loan size, 
interest rate charged by VBSP is relatively low, 0.65% compared to 1-1.08% and 1.25% charged by 
VBARD (for the poor) and PCFs, respectively. Similarly, the average loan size is also the smallest 
(USD 521 compared to USD 1,094 and USD 769 offered by VBARD and PCFs, respectively) (ADB, 
2010).  
c) People’s Credit Funds (PCFs) 
Established in 1995, PCFs are organised as financial cooperatives which provide financial services 
to commune based members. As reported by ADB (2010), at the end of 2009, the membership of 
total funds were 1.5 million, of which 953,736 members were borrowers. Women and the poor 
constitute 30% and 10% of the total borrowers, respectively. Only members of PCFs have the right 
to obtain loan from the Funds, but a household only needs to contribute VND 50,000 to be a 
member. The ease of entry allows the funds to expand outreach to poor households. However, it 
is worth noting that based on the members’ contribution, PCFs in poor areas often have weak 
financial status and their lending capacity is limited, thus, households in the rural poor find it 
difficult to  obtain loan from PCFs. Moreover, PCFs operate as banks which prefer to offer loan to 
large scale borrowers to lower transaction cost. Since the poor is not the target group of PCFs, 
they are more likely to be refused (Putzeys, 2002).  
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2.1.2. Semi-formal lenders 
Semi-formal lenders in Vietnam are mainly microfinance institutions managed by Non-government 
Organisations (NGOs) and funded by international donors. Before 2005, microfinance institutions 
were not recognised by Law as a part of Vietnam credit system. Not until the Decree 28 in 2005 
and then revised by Decree 165 issued in 2007, the organisation and operation of microfinance in 
Vietnam had been regulated. In addition, these documents instructed the process for non-
governmental entities to set up formal credit institutions in Vietnam or formalise existing semi-
formal institutions. However, up to the end of 2012, only two out of 50 semi-formal institutions 
operating in Vietnam have been licensed (ADB, 2010).   
In general, the target group of semi-formal lenders is poor households residing in disadvantaged 
areas such as mountainous and remote areas, or minority ethnic group. Coverage of these 
institutions are still limited in small and dispersed communities, therefore, the total borrowers 
served by semi-formal credit is still low (less than 1% of total borrowers) (ADB, 2010). As observed 
by Quach (2005) the strength of semi-formal institutions is capacity development through 
technical assistance for political and social organisations such as woman union, youth union and 
farmer union. The poor and women are efficiently reached by these institutions and less likely to 
be excluded since they are identified as the target group. However, semi-formal institutions still 
encounter high operating cost and limited outreach due to small scale.  
2.1.3. Informal lenders 
The role of informal lenders in rural credit market is still a controversial issue. On one hand, money 
lenders are criticised for charging exploitative interest rate, behave optimistically, and are 
attributed to vicious indebted circle of rural households. On the other hand, it is argued that 
interest rate charged by informal lenders reflects accurately the transaction cost and risk of rural 
credit transaction. Informal credit is also distributed more efficiently than formal credit and meet 
promptly household’s consumption need, which is often omitted by formal credit (Ghate, 1992). In 
Vietnam, although the predominance of informal credit came to an end with the expansion of 
subsidised credit, its importance to rural households is still affirmed.  
a) Relatives and Friends 
Conventionally, relatives and friends are the first source of credit households seek when they have 
income shocks or unexpected events. Free Interest rate, prompt delivery, flexible duration and 
payment schedule are the characteristics of this type of credit. However, not every households 
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have good network of well-off relatives and friends, and poor households are unlikely to borrow 
from this source due to the complicated social implications (Quach, 2005) . Since there are limited 
studies on this source of credit in Vietnam, stability and availability of credit from relatives and 
friends are still questionable. 
b) Money lenders 
Money lenders in the rural area often live in the same communes with borrowers and may provide 
loans in form of cash or goods. They can be permanent or seasonal lenders. According to Quach 
(2005), each village in Vietnam has 2 to 3 permanent and 5 to 10 seasonal lenders. They do not 
require collateral and offer flexible term of payment but usually charge high interest rate. Money 
lenders have their own methods to force borrowers to repay. Similar to formal lenders, money 
lenders also encounter adverse selection, therefore, they tend to limit their lending to certain 
number of creditworthy clients (Bell, 1990). As reported by GSO (2009), the percentage of 
households obtaining loan from money lender is relatively low (8.5% in 2008) and on the 
downward trend. However, we should analyse this number with caution. In Vietnam, money 
lenders are often referred to “black credit” which has a negative connotation that transaction is 
dubious. Households are reluctant to report their loans from money lenders because it implies 
they are in not good financial standing.  
c) Rotating Savings Credit Associations (ROSCAs) 
ROSCAs are known under different names such as “Ho” in the North, “Phuong” in the Middle and 
“Hui” in the South. They are referred to groups of members who have acquaintanceship and trust 
each other, contributing property to form periodic saving and lending process. Interest rate, loan 
amount and distribution are determined by mutual agreement among members, group leaders or 
by bidding. The scale of ROSCAs varies, depending on the number of members and members’ fund 
contribution. Since ROSCAs’ operation is not regulated, right and liability of members are not 
protected by Law. When the associations collapse due to borrowers’ failure to repay, all members 
have to bear the loss (Quach, 2005).    
In summary, the overview of Vietnam rural credit market confirms its uniformity with the 
structure of rural credit market in developing countries in terms of main market players and the 
role of the government interventions. Analysis on characteristics of formal lenders shows the 
prominent role of VBSP, VBARD and PCFs in providing loan to rural households. However, it also 
raises the concerns that although the poor is the primary target group of the governmental 
program related to rural credit, they still encounter difficulties in accessing credit from the 
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subsidised institutions. Limitation on loan size and collateral requirement imposed by some formal 
financial institutions show the signs of credit constraints.        
2.2. Review of related literature 
2.2.1. Definition of Credit constraints 
The term “credit constraint” used in this study is different from credit rationing defined in Stiglitz 
and Weiss’s (1981) study. Credit rationing theory developed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) focuses 
on the supply side while credit constraint covers both supply and demand side or external and 
internal rationing (Fenwick & Lyne, 1998). In other words, credit rationing is a particular case of 
credit constraint. However, the two terms can be used interchangeably without causing any 
misunderstanding.  
According to Barham, Boucher, and Carter (1996) and Boucher, Guirkinger, and Trivelli (2009), 
credit constraints can be categorised into three groups: quantity constraint, risk constraint and 
transaction cost constraint. Quantity rationing involves the supply side while the two are 
associated with the demand side. Quantity constraint refers to those whose loan applications are 
rejected or successful but the total amount of credit obtained is below the requested amount. 
Households are considered to be risk rationed when they have demand for credit, but do not apply 
for the fear of losing their collaterals. The disappearance of insurance market and idiosyncratic 
shocks such as natural disasters and price violation discourage rural households from using their 
asset to gain credit especially when the collateral is housing or land, which is their most important 
production inputs. Transaction cost constraint implies that the households have positive notional 
demand for loan but due to the high transaction cost of loan application and process, their 
investments become non-profitable. Additional case studied by Kumar, Turvey, and Kropp (2013) 
reveals that farmers do not access credit market perhaps for the fear of rejection (since they have 
experienced rejection before). It can be categorised as quantity rationing.  
Conventionally, loan non-applicants are assumed to have no demand for credit, therefore they are 
categorised to be credit unconstrained. However, it is evidenced that failure to consider the 
demand side constraint may underestimate the demand for credit as well as credit constraint 
situation in the rural area. Assuming “nonparticipation in the credit market stems from either an 
effective constraint on access to formal sector or low demand” (Kochar, 1997b, pp. 349-350), 
Kochar (1997b) concludes that credit demand of rural households in India is rather low and credit 
constraints are not serious. On the contrary, other studies have shown that internal rationing is 
the main hindrances of the households’ participation in the credit market.  The result from the 
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survey conducted by Bashir and Azeem (2008) in Pakistan suggests that loan procedure and delay 
in providing loan are the main constraints confronted by the farmers. Barham et al. (1996) identify 
internal rationing in Guatemala is more serious than external rationing.  Fenwick and Lyne (1998) 
provide empirical evidences of the significant relationship between high transaction cost as well as 
risk perception and farm household’s likelihood to borrow. Yu (2008) argues that the demand side 
constraint is as serious as supply side constraint in China. Examining credit constraints in Peru, 
Honduras and Nicaragua, Boucher et al. (2008) find risk rationing account for 20% to 40% of non-
price rationing cases.  
2.2.2. Causes of credit constraints 
Classical theories attribute asymmetric information to credit rationing (Jaffee & Modigliani, 1969; 
Jaffee & Stiglitz, 1990; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). In a world of imperfection information, when there 
is excessive demand of credit over supply, banks are reluctant to increase interest rate from the 
prevailing interest rate 𝑟𝑟∗  to the rate of 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 equating supply and demand, which may lead to the 
increase of loan defaults (see  Figure 2.1A). 
The defaults arise from adverse selection and moral hazard behaviour that reduce repayment rate 
which then reduce their total revenue from 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗ to 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐 (see Figure 2.2B). Since high interest rate 
excludes risk-adverse borrowers who often invest in safe but low return projects, the pool of 
borrowers becomes worse off (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). The remaining borrowers in the pool are 
risky borrowers. High interest rate also encourages borrowers to invest in high risk projects which 
lead to higher probability of defaults (Ravallion & Wodon, 1999; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Requiring 
more collaterals yields similar effects (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). As a result, at the prevailing interest 
rate some borrowers are excluded by banks. 
In rural area, credit constraints not only result from information asymmetry but also high 
transaction cost and high risk that prevent formal financial institutions from providing credit to the 
market (Meyer & Nagarajan, 2000; Petrick, 2005; Zeller & Sharma, 1998). Geographical dispersal 
and small loan size are the causes of high transaction cost. Moreover, due to uncertainty in 
agricultural production, lack of collaterals, the absence of insurance market for rural households 
and enforcement issue, banks are therefore reluctant to lend to rural households (Hoff & Stiglitz, 
1990; Meyer & Nagarajan, 2000). Although subsidised credit in developing countries aims at 
relaxing credit constraints for rural farm households, it is blamed to favour better off farmers 
because high cost of obtaining information from small-scale borrowers discourages banks to offer 
loan to them (Carter, 1988; Conning & Udry, 2007). The credit constraints are also attributed to 
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transaction cost impeding farm households from approaching formal lenders (Adams & Graham, 
1981) 
Source: Adapted from (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981) 
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Figure 2.2    Interest rate at market equilibrium and credit rationing 
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2.2.3. Methods to identify and measure credit constraints 
Methods to identify credit constraints are grouped into indirect and direct method (Diagne, Zeller, 
& Sharma, 2000; Gilligan, Harrower, Quisumbing, & Sharma, 2005). Indirect method is based on 
the theoretical difference of key parameters between credit constrained and unconstrained 
households. An example of indirect method is life cycle model which assumes that “in the absence 
of liquidity and borrowing constraints, transitory income shocks should not affect consumption” 
(Diagne et al., 2000, p. 4). However, there is ambiguity on the conclusiveness of this method since 
precautionary households may reduce consumption expenditure to cope with negative income 
shock regardless of whether they are credit constrained or not (Diagne et al., 2000).  Direct 
method or so called Direct Elicitation method (DEM) (Boucher et al., 2009) is associated with 
information collected from household surveys with a set of questions to identify whether a 
household is credit constrained. While the validity of this method is questionable (Petrick, 2005), it 
is proven by Gilligan et al. (2005) and Boucher et al. (2009) to be reliable.  Using consumption 
smoothing and farm labour demand model, Gilligan et al. (2005) confirm the consistency of DEM 
result. Results from the multinomial logit regression model developed by Boucher et al. (2009) 
show that DEM classification is accurate. Similarly, Gilligan et al. (2005) emphasise that the validity 
and effectiveness of the survey on credit rationing depend on the quality of questions. The 
irrefutable drawback of this method is that it cannot recognise efficient versus inefficient excluded 
demand. Another shortcoming of this method is inability of measuring the extent households are 
constrained (Diagne et al., 2000). Petrick (2004b, 2005) recommends a combination of qualitative 
information from survey and static household models which is of twofold: identify credit rationing 
and measure the efficiency of credit rationing. The latter can be achieved by comparing the 
willingness to pay (marginal production of capital), market interest rate and actual interest rate 
(equal to sum of market interest rate and transaction cost). However, the mixed method is data 
demanding and time consuming.  Methods to identify credit constrained households will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.   
2.2.4. Determinants of credit constraints 
Studies on determinants of credit constraints focus on three groups of factors namely 
characteristics of household head, household characteristics and geography related factors. 
2.2.4.1. Characteristics of household head 
The most frequent variables related to household head used to explain the credit constraint status 
are age, gender and education. The hypothesised sign of age is ambiguous. In terms of demand 
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side, older farmers may have higher demand for credit since they are more experienced, then are 
more likely to invest. However, they may require less credit if they are more conservative and 
accumulate enough wealth (Freeman, Ehui, & Jabbar, 1998; Pham & Izumida, 2002). In light of the 
supply side, older farmers may be more trusted by the banks (Franklin, Diagne, & Zeller, 2008), or 
considered to be less labour capable than younger borrowers (Winter-Nelson & Temu, 2005), thus, 
they may be more or less rationed by the banks. Empirically, previous studies show mixed results. 
Freeman et al. (1998) and Jia et al. (2010) find a negative relationship between age and possibility 
of being credit constrained which is consistent with Barslund and Tarp (2008) in the case of 
Vietnam. Baiyegunhi et al. (2010), Chaudhuri et al. (2011), show inverse result which is confirmed 
by studies of Omonona, Akinterinwa, and Awoyinka (2008) and Omonona, Jimoh, and Awoyinka 
(2008). Some studies use age square variable to examine the nonlinear relationship with credit 
constraint status of farm households (Kuwornu, Ohene-Ntow, & Asuming-Brempong, 2012; Zeller, 
1994), but neither of the studies show the significant effect of age square on household’s credit 
constraint status. 
Similarly, the expected effect of gender on credit constraints is theoretically ambiguous. On one 
hand, male-headed households seem to have higher demand for credit (Mpuga, 2010) since they 
have better access to production resources. Further, they are disadvantaged to approach 
subsidised credit which is often in favour of women, thus, they are more likely to be credit 
constrained. On the other hand, they are more self-financed than their female counterparts 
(Franklin et al., 2008). Nevertheless, empirical studies show that male is more likely to be credit 
constrained (Chaudhuri & Cherical, 2011; Freeman et al., 1998; Kuwornu et al., 2012; Omonona, 
Akinterinwa, et al., 2008; Zeller, 1994). Studies on rural Vietnam show similar results (Barslund & 
Tarp, 2008; Pham & Izumida, 2002). 
Education of household head is expected to improve the accessibility to formal credit since more 
educated farmers are believed to allocate credit more efficiently (Kuwornu et al., 2012; Pham & 
Izumida, 2002). However, previous studies showed education to be significant only in Barslund and 
Tarp’s (2008), Jia et al.’s (2010), Omonona, Akinterinwa, et al.’s (2008) and Zeller’s (1994) studies. 
Surprisingly, Zeller (1994) shows households to have higher propensity of being credit constrained 
when they have more years of formal education. It may be due to the fact that the purpose of 
subsidised loan is for disadvantaged and illiterate households (Franklin et al., 2008) 
Another household head characteristic considered in credit constraint assessment is farm 
experience (Freeman et al., 1998; Petrick, 2004a; Reyes, 2011). However this variable is 
statistically significant only in Reyes’s (2011) study. Thus cautions should be taken to use both age 
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and farm experience variables in a model as the two variables may be highly correlated.  
2.2.4.2. Household’s characteristics 
2.2.4.2a. Physical capital related factors 
Physical capital can reduce the probability of being credit constrained since it can be used as 
collateral to minimise repayment default and evidence of household production capacity. Land 
title, land area, value of house, asset and livestock are popular indicators for physical capital. In 
general, households having land title are less likely to be credit constrained (Baiyegunhi, 2008; 
Boucher et al., 2009; Foltz, 2004). It should be emphasised that the effect of land title is clear, but 
the effect of land area is ambiguous. In some countries, farm land cannot be used as a collateral 
for example in China (Jia et al., 2010), thus, land area may have positive, negative, or no effect on 
credit constraints, depending on its effect on demand for credit. In fact, Foltz (2004) argues that 
land title can loosen credit restriction, but land area has insignificant effect. In China, Peru and 
Malawi, more farm land area means higher propensity to be credit rationed (Boucher et al., 2009; 
Jia et al., 2010; Simtowe, Diagne, & Zeller, 2008) which is also reported in Petrick’s (2004a) study 
on the effect of rented land. On the contrary, Reyes (2011) and Omonona, Akinterinwa, et al. 
(2008) find the contributory effect of land area to ease credit rationing. Both land area and land 
use right (red book) in Vietnam have insignificant effect on the bank’s decision to provide credit 
(Barslund & Tarp, 2008; Nguyen, 2007; Pham & Izumida, 2002). 
Asset (including wealth) can be a proxy for household’s physical capital. It is expected that 
households possessing more valuable asset are less dependent on credit and have more capacity 
to repay debt, therefore, are more likely to be credit unconstrained (Baiyegunhi et al., 2010; 
Boucher et al., 2009). Depending on the studied area, indicators for assets may be availability of 
durable assets (Fenwick & Lyne, 1998), age of collateral assets (Petrick, 2004a), value of durable or 
total assets (Baiyegunhi et al., 2010; Boucher et al., 2009; Chaudhuri & Cherical, 2011) or weighted 
average durable assets (Winter-Nelson & Temu, 2005). Pham et al. (2002) and Barslund (2008) find 
insignificant effect of total asset value on lending decision of financial institutions in Vietnam. This 
independent relationship can be explained by the weak enforcement of credit contract in Vietnam 
that makes physical collateral an ineffective screening device. The statistically insignificant 
relationship between livestock value and credit constraints implies that livestock is rarely accepted 
as collateral by formal financial institutions (Chaudhuri & Cherical, 2011; Fenwick & Lyne, 1998). 
Some physical capital related indicators representing production capacity rather than collateral 
value such as herd size or farm size also significantly affect credit restriction (Freeman et al., 1998; 
Kuwornu et al., 2012).   
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2.2.4.2b. Human capital related factors 
Indicators for human capital include household size, dependency ratio, number of labours, number 
of males, and number of females. Families with higher number of persons are expected to have 
higher consumption expenditure which decreases available capital to production and increases 
their dependence on credit. The effect of family size on the supply side of credit is vague. 
Therefore, households with larger family size are more inclined to be credit constrained 
(Chaudhuri & Cherical, 2011; Kuwornu et al., 2012).  Other studies pay attention on dependency 
ratio on which the hypothesised sign is unanticipated. Households with fewer labours seem to 
invest less, and have less demand for credit. However, higher dependency ratio may mean higher 
demand for credit due to high ratio of expenditure to income, especially in poor families (Jia et al., 
2010). Empirically, this variable can have a negative (Pham & Izumida, 2002) or positive effect 
(Freeman et al., 1998) on the accessibility to formal credit. Instead of using dependency ratio, 
some studies separately examine the effect of the number of dependents and adults on credit 
constraints (Barslund & Tarp, 2008), while some separate the effect of male and female labours 
(Boucher et al., 2009; Petrick, 2004a; Simtowe et al., 2008). It is found that families with more 
adults are more likely to be credit constrained as they have higher demand for credit (Barslund & 
Tarp, 2008), but the effect of male and female labours are mixed. While households with more 
female labours are found to experience a disadvantage in attracting credit by Petrick’s (2004a), 
Simtowe et al.’s (2008) study concludes more male labours increase the likelihood of being credit 
rationed.   
In the areas where there are training programs to support farmers to enhance their farm 
production, participation of farmers in these programs becomes an important variable. Farmers 
who participate in these programs have a higher probability to obtain credit since they are 
expected to be more productive (Reyes, 2011). Surprisingly, Freeman et al. (1998) demonstrate 
opposite finding, but the unexpected result is not explained by the authors. 
Another indicator associated with human capital is medical and education expenditures which 
force households to seek external finance. According to Jia et al.’s (2010) study, the more 
households spend on medical and education, the more likely they are credit constrained.  
2.2.4.2c. Social capital related factors 
Social capital plays a crucial role in determining the success of households to attain credit, 
especially when physical collateral becomes ineffective loan screening device. Social capital can be 
divided into three types: the social status of households in community, the relationship of 
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households with financial institutions and social group participation. Reputation, social status or 
entitlement in community (Jia et al., 2010; Pham & Izumida, 2002) is hypothesised to increase 
households’ accessibility to formal credit. Interestingly, Petrick’s (2004b) study shows that 
households who have conversation with neighbours frequently are more likely to be credit 
constrained as information related to their creditworthiness is uncovered. The good relationship 
with financial institutions measured by the length of relationship with banks (Reyes, 2011), 
connections with bank official (Barslund & Tarp, 2008) or savings account in banks (Gershon, Lau, 
Lin, & Luo, 1990) also helps households ease credit rationing. Similarly, repayment history can be 
regarded as a type of social capital. Households with bad credit history are more likely to be credit 
constrained (Barslund & Tarp, 2008; Chaudhuri & Cherical, 2011; Freeman et al., 1998).  
Participating in social groups reduces the probability of being rejected by financial institutions 
since it decreases transaction cost to screen the household’s creditworthiness (Reyes, 2011; 
Winter-Nelson & Temu, 2005). Dinh, Dufhues, and Buchenrieder (2012) use four indicators such as 
strong and weak ties to persons of similar (for example friends and family) and higher (for instance 
local authority) social standing to measure household’s social capital in Vietnam. However none of 
these indicators is found to have effect on the likelihood that farm households are credit 
constrained. 
2.2.4.2d. Economic related factors 
Economic indicators such as income, expenditure and savings are used to assess the household’s 
wealth, liquidity and repayment capacity. The effect of income on credit constraints is significant 
in Gershon et al.’s (1990) and Kuwornu et al.’s (2012) studies, but the hypothesised sign is 
opposite. Households with high income may exhibit good financial status or depend more on 
credit since they often deal with capital intensive activities. Foltz’s (2004) study is the only study 
which shows significant effect between household expenditure and credit rationing. A major 
concern with these studies is the endogenous problem as credit constraints have been proven to 
have significant impact on income and expenditure (Baiyegunhi et al., 2010; Li & Zhi, 2010). Other 
studies pay attention to the ratio of debt to income which is evidenced to curtail the households’ 
probability of obtaining formal credit (Baiyegunhi, 2008; Zeller, 1994).   
Barslund and Tarp (2008) and Freeman et al. (1998) study the effect of production expenditure on 
credit constraints but only Barslund and Tarp’s (2008) study shows significant positive relationship 
between expenditure on livestock feed and credit constraints.  
It is believed that the main sources of household income are correlated with their credit constraint 
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status. Economic activities which are prioritised by the government, more familiar to financial 
institutions and less risky increase the opportunity for households to obtain loan. Jia et al. (2010) 
and Chaudhuri and Cherical (2011) illustrate that households who are more dependent on farming 
are less likely to fall into the credit constrained category since farming is prioritised by the 
government. On the contrary, finding of Stampini and Davis (2009) implies that non-agricultural 
income reduces the dependence of farm households on credit, thus, relax credit constraints. The 
fluctuation of farm yields (Boucher et al., 2009), changes in agricultural product prices (Winter-
Nelson & Temu, 2005), and engagement with atypical crops (Reyes, 2011) can aggravate credit 
constraints.  
2.2.4.3. Geography related factors 
According to Boucher et al. (2009) and Winter-Nelson and Temu (2005), distance to market or 
formal lenders increases transaction cost on households, therefore, exacerbates credit constraints. 
In addition, Barslund and Tarp’s (2008) and Foltz’s (2004) studies show that credit constraints are 
also determined by activeness of local credit institutions and local production development.  
Barslund and Tarp’s (2008) study indicates in Vietnam, in the areas where formal credit is more 
prevalent, households are less likely to be credit constrained. However, there is a concern that the 
result suffers from simultaneity problem as lower probability of being constrained attaches the 
households to formal credit.   
2.2.5. Impact of credit constraint on rural households 
Credit plays a crucial role to household production and welfare, however, whether formal credit 
constraints have adverse impact is still questionable. The studies focusing on productivity show 
mixed results. By comparing land lease of formal credit borrowers and non-borrowers, Kochar 
(1997a) concludes that credit has insignificant effect on land lease, and the impact of credit 
rationing from formal financial sector on production is modest in India. The rationale behind 
Kochar’s result is that credit does not affect input investment (land), then credit restriction also 
does not affect production. The problem of this finding is that it does not take into account the 
marginal production of land which determines the investment in land. Another problem is the 
effect of land on productivity may be insignificant as documented in Reyes’s (2011) study. 
Therefore, it is not convincing to infer negligible impact of credit constraints on production from 
the insignificant effect of credit on land leasing. The study of Reyes (2011) on credit constraints in 
Chile shares similar conclusion with Kochar. Result from Reyes’s switching regression model 
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reveals that credit constraints do not directly or indirectly affect productivity. It is explained by the 
availability of alternative sources of working capital which effectively substitute for formal credit.  
Other studies have shown inverse findings. For example, Gershon et al. (1990) reveal liquidity has 
significant effect on credit constrained households’ productivity whereas insignificant on 
unconstrained households’. The authors’ switching regression model also reveals that the lack of 
credit reduces the contribution of capital and human resources to output. Additional evidence on 
the diminished marginal effect of human resource on output due to credit restriction is 
documented in Freeman et al.’s (1998) and Guirkinger and Boucher’s (2008) studies. Freeman et 
al. (1998) and Guirkinger and Boucher (2008) also reveal that for credit constrained farmers, 
expenditure on input is important to output but has negligible effect on output of credit 
unconstrained households. This finding is also confirmed by Winter-Nelson and Temu’s (2005) and 
Guirkinger and Boucher’s (2008) studies on liquidity constraints in Tanzania and Peru, respectively. 
Furthermore, Winter-Nelson and Temu (2005) argue that relaxing credit constraints can improve 
productivity, which is supported by Guirkinger and Boucher’s (2008), Dong, Lu, and Featherstone’s 
(2010) and Kumar et al.’s (2013) studies.  
Yu's (2008) study is the only study considering the impact of credit constraints on rural 
household’s entrepreneurship. The study suggests that credit constraints have no effect on 
entrepreneurship of China rural households as capital requirement for establishing enterprise is 
low and credit shortage can be offset by other sources of fund and resources.  
In terms of household welfare, Dong et al. (2010), Li and Zhi (2010) and Kumar et al. (2013) 
indicate that credit constraints are detrimental to household income. Credit constraints cause a 
loss of 13.2% of net income in rural China (Li & Zhi, 2010) and removal of constraints in credit can 
improve income by 23.2% (Dong et al., 2010). Furthermore, credit constraints are attributed to the 
decrease in household consumption. Credit constrained households suffer a loss of 15.8% and 
18.2% in consumption expenditure in Li and Zhi’s (2010) and Li, Li, Huang, and Zhu’s (2013) 
studies, respectively. The results are consistent with the findings of Zeldes (1989), Phimister 
(1995), Baiyegunhi et al. (2010) and Kumar et al. (2013).  
Although the importance of credit especially microfinance to Vietnam rural households has been 
confirmed by many studies (see Nghiem, Coelli, & Rao (2012); Nguyen, Bigman, Van den Berg, & 
Vu (2007) and Phan (2012)), to the best of our knowledge, there is no study examining the impact 
of credit constraints on rural household outcomes.   
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2.3. Chapter Summary  
A review of Vietnam rural credit market uncovers the prominent role of formal credit especially 
subsidised credit provided by VBARD, VBSP and PCFs. Although the establishment of subsidised 
financial institutions aims at reducing poverty and income inequality by enhancing the accessibility 
of rural households, particularly the poor to credit, there is a concern that the poor is more likely 
to be constrained by formal lenders. The lending scheme of VBARD and PCFs seems to be in favour 
of better off and large farm households. VBSP, on the other hand, is considered to be the bank for 
the poor, but abundant borrowing projects assigned by the government and limited fund do not 
allow the bank to offer large loan size. It is rational to believe that in rural Vietnam many farm 
households are still constrained by formal financial institutions even when formal lenders expand 
their operation to almost all communes.  
It is documented in previous studies that the likelihood farm households are constrained by formal 
creditors depends on their physical capital, human capital, social capital, economic activities and 
geographical location. Although the results of these studies on the effect of some factors such as 
age, farm land area or dependency ratio are mixed, in general, households with female head, high 
social status, small size, and good relationship with banks are less likely to be credit rationed. 
Table 2.4 provides a summary of key factors affecting credit constraint status of farm households.  
Results from previous studies also reveal the negative impact of credit constraints on the farm 
household’s productivity and welfare. Lack of credit prevents the households from making full use 
of their physical and human capital. However, some studies postulate that accessibility to informal 
credit can mitigate adverse effect of formal credit constraints.   
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Table 2.4      Summary of key factors affecting credit constraint status of farm households 
Factors Expected sign Authors 
Individual level    
Gender (female) - Freeman et al. (1998); Jia et al. (2010); 
Barslund and Tarp (2008); Kuwornu et al. (2012) 
Pham and Izumida (2002); Zeller (1994) 
Age +/- 
Education +/- 
Household level   
Land title - Baiyegunhi (2008); Boucher et al. (2009); Foltz (2004) 
Farm land area +/- 
Boucher et al. (2009); Pham and Izumida (2002); Jia et 
al. (2010) 
Asset - Baiyegunhi (2008); Boucher et al. (2009) 
Family size + Chaudhuri and Cherical (2011); Kuwornu et al. (2012) 
Dependency ratio +/- Pham and Izumida (2002);Freeman et al. (1998) 
Social status - Pham and Izumida (2002); Jia et al. (2010) 
Social group - Winter-Nelson and Temu (2005); Reyes (2011) 
Bad repayment history + Barslund and Tarp (2008); Freeman et al. (1998) 
Relationship with banks - Barslund and Tarp (2008); Reyes (2011) 
Ratio debt to income + Baiyegunhi (2008); Zeller (1994) 
Main economic activities +/- Jia et al. (2010); Reyes (2011) 
Geography   
Distance ( market, bank) + Boucher et al. (2009); Winter-Nelson and Temu (2005) 
Location difference +/- Barslund and Tarp (2008); Zeller (1994) 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
This chapter provides an overview of the methods used to study credit constraints on Vietnam 
rural farm households and data collection procedure. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 
3.1 presents the methods to identify credit constrained households, followed by details of the 
framework used in this study. Section 3.2 introduces the empirical models to identify the factors 
influencing the households’ credit constraint status and evaluate the impact of credit constraints.  
Questionnaire design and data collection process are described in Section 3.3. The last section 
summarises the Chapter.  
3.1. Method for identifying credit constrained households 
3.1.1. Overview of the methods for identifying credit constrained households 
In order to determine the determinants of credit constraints, it is essential to categorise 
appropriately households into credit constrained and unconstrained groups. As reviewed in 
Chapter 2, there are two types of method to identify credit constraints, namely, direct and indirect 
methods. The choice of direct or indirect method depends on the study’s objectives and the 
availability of data. The following sections present the advantages and drawbacks of each method.  
3.1.1.1. Indirect method 
The indirect method is based on key theoretical differences between credit constrained and 
unconstrained households’ behaviours to determine the presence of credit constraints, especially 
in consumption and investment. Examples of the indirect method application includes Zeldes’s 
(1989), Hubbard and Kashyap’s (1990) and Bell’s (1990) studies. 
Based on the household’s wealth and ratio of financial asset to income, Zeldes (1989) categorises 
the households into two groups and identifies which groups is more likely to be credit constrained 
than the other. Subsequently, Euler equation and Lagrange multiplier are used to test the 
presence of credit constraints in the two groups. The rationale behind the use of Euler equation 
and Lagrange multiplier is that credit constraints prevent households from transferring resources 
from tomorrow’s to today’s consumption, thus, leading to the relatively higher marginal utility of 
today’s consumption than tomorrow’s consumption. As a result, Euler equation is violated and 
Lagrange multiplier always exhibits positive value with the presence of credit constraints. Similarly, 
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Hubbard and Kashyap (1990) employ Euler equation for farm’s investment to detect market 
imperfection (implying credit rationing). The authors use the farm’s net worth as a representative 
for farm’s probability of being credit rationed. The violation of Euler equation in the period of low 
equity confirms the effect of credit rationing. The drawback in using Euler equation is the 
equation’s inability to recognise non-binding constraints since Euler equation is still satisfied with 
the presence of non-binding constraints. In addition, Zeldes (1989) acknowledges the possibility 
that credit constrained households are included in the credit unconstrained group and vice versa 
as the division of households is only based on the household’s financial resources. Moreover, the 
rejection of permanent income hypothesis may be attributed to aggregation bias rather than the 
presence of credit constraints (Runkle, 1991). Therefore, the results are sensitive to the method 
used to analyse the data. Finally, due to the inaccuracy in recognising credit constraint status of 
each household, the indirect method may lead to incorrect results in identifying the factors 
influencing credit constraints. 
Bell (1990) considers the loan from money lenders to be a sign of formal credit constraints when 
bank credit is assumed to be preferred. Nevertheless, Bell’s method has not been widely used 
because not every households borrow from money lenders when they are constrained by formal 
financial institutions, thus, this method fails to capture the credit rationing status of non-
borrowers.   
In general, the application of the indirect method requires large data set, specifically panel data as 
it assures the robustness of the tests even when some households are wrongly categorised. 
However, indirect method is only able to conclude the binding credit constraint status of a group, 
but unable to identify credit constraint status of an individual household, non-binding credit 
constraints, as well as provide information related to the causes of credit constraints. 
3.1.1.2. Direct method  
Due to the questionable accuracy and sensitivity of the indirect method, some authors 
recommend the use of the direct method or so-called Direct Elicitation Method (DEM) to identify 
the determinants and measure the influences of credit constraints (Boucher et al., 2009; Diagne et 
al., 2000; Feder, 1985; Franklin et al., 2008; Zeller, 1994). Different from the indirect method that 
only considers binding constraint, the direct method covers both binding and non-binding 
constraints. Credit constraints can be expressed by the direct method as follows. Let 𝐿𝐿 denote the 
amount of loan household 𝑥𝑥 demands. 𝑆𝑆∗ denotes the amount of credit limited set by the credit 
institution, which is the amount of credit maximising the lender’s return. The total value of asset 
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possessed by the household is given as 𝐴𝐴. The probability that the project invested by the 
household is successful is 𝑝𝑝, and the probability of failure is 1 − 𝑝𝑝. The interest rate charged by the 
lender is 𝑖𝑖. The collateral requirement per unit loan is 𝑘𝑘. The return from a unit loan is 𝑟𝑟. The 
transaction cost for loan application is 𝑇𝑇. Then, the household expected return is: 
 ( )1TR L r i p kL p
L
 = − − − − 
 
       (3.1) 
The optimal amount of loan 𝐿𝐿∗ requested by the household maximises the household expected 
return subject to 𝑘𝑘𝐿𝐿∗ < 𝐴𝐴. The binding constraint so-called quantity constraint occurs when 𝐿𝐿∗ >
𝑆𝑆∗. The binding constraint is from the supply side.  
On the contrary, non-binding constraint includes transaction cost and risk constraints which are 
from the demand side. The household is considered to be transaction cost constrained when the 
household’s project is notionally profitable (𝑟𝑟 − 𝑖𝑖 > 0), but due to high transaction cost it 
becomes unprofitable (𝑟𝑟 − 𝑖𝑖 − 𝑇𝑇
𝐿𝐿
≤ 0). Risk constraint occurs when the collateral requirement is so 
high that the benefit the household gains when the project is successful becomes lower than the 
loss they bear if the project fails, generating non-positive expected return. Households who are 
demand side constrained do not apply for loan. Therefore, practically, it is difficult to identify 
credit unconstrained non-borrowers and constrained non-borrowers by observation.  
The advantage of the direct method over the indirect method is that the former enables to 
identify both binding and non-binding constraints. In addition, the credit constraint status of each 
household can be detected by the direct method as well as the credit constrained group they 
belong to. However, the drawback of the direct method is that it is unable to differentiate 
between efficient and inefficient constraints as it does not consider the household’s repayment 
capacity. Petrick (2004b, 2005) proposes the combination of qualitative information from 
household survey (direct method) and the static household models to examine the efficiency of 
credit rationing. From the coefficients obtained from estimating output supply model, Petrick 
(2004b) calculates marginal willingness to pay for credit of credit constrained households. 
Comparison between willingness to pay rate and nominal interest rate reveals the household’s 
repayment capacity, allows the author to conclude whether the credit rationing is efficient or not. 
However, in order to apply Petrick’s method for cross-sectional data, the loan should be short 
term because in the long-term, output supply is affected by time variant factors such as crop 
fluctuation and price. In addition, if the household’s loan is used for human capital investment 
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(education consumption), Petrick’s approach cannot capture the household’s future income 
gained from human capital enhancement. Finally, it is difficult to apply Petrick’s method when the 
households are engaged in various income generated activities.  
3.1.2. Empirical method for identifying credit constrained households 
In this study, we apply the direct method, using a series of questions to identify each type of credit 
constraints. Detail of our framework is illustrated in Figure 3.1.  
Source: Boucher et al. (2009) 
Based on the household’s response to the survey questions “Did you apply for any loan in 2012?” 
(Question 1), “Were any of your loan applications rejected by formal creditors?” (Question 2) and 
“Did the loan amount offered meet your request?" (Question 3), quantity constrained households 
are detected. Households who answer “yes” to question 1 and “yes” to question 2 or “no” to 
question 3 are considered to be credit constrained.  Households who respond “no” to question 1 
are then asked “what are the main reasons that you did not apply for loans?” (Question 4). 
Households will be categorised into transaction cost constrained group if the reason they choose is 
Figure 3.1 Framework for identifying credit constrained households 
Complicated 
and time 
consuming 
procedure 
In 2012, have you applied 
for a loan from Banks, 
VBSP, PCFs 
Yes No 
Why? 
Don’t 
have 
demand 
Fear of 
rejection 
Fear of 
losing 
collateral 
Which 
institutions 
rejected your 
loan? Why? 
The amount 
offered met 
your request? 
Quantity 
constraint 
Unconstraint Quantity 
constraint 
Transaction 
cost 
constraint 
Risk 
constraint 
Quantity 
constraint 
Unconstraint 
Were any of your 
applications rejected? 
Yes No 
Yes No 
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“Complicated and time consuming loan application and process procedure”. Risk constrained 
group comprises of the households who respond “fear of losing collateral” or “fear of being in 
debt” to question 4. If the household’s reason for loan non-application is “fear of being rejected”, 
they are considered to be quantity constrained. Credit unconstrained households are those who 
did not have demand for loan or received sufficient amount of loan they requested for (see Figure 
3.1 for details).  
In our survey, we focus only on credit constraints from formal financial institutions, however, we 
do not conceive that formal institutions are the first sources of loan the households are looking for 
when they need to borrow since they can find a cheaper loan from informal creditors (Kochar, 
1997b). Therefore, in our survey, if the households respond that they did not borrow from formal 
credit institutions because of lower interest rate offered by informal sources (such as from friends, 
relatives or ROSCA), they are not categorised to be credit constrained by formal financial 
institutions. Although we do not survey informal credit constraints, we compare between the 
amount of credit the households needed to borrow and the amount they received to check 
whether informal credit sufficiently substituted for formal credit in case the households were 
rationed by formal lenders.  
It is acknowledged that the direct method is unable to differentiate between efficient and 
inefficient constraints, however, we cannot use the static household models recommended by 
Petrick (2004b) to test the classification of the direct method for three reasons. First, our data is 
cross-sectional and many surveyed households applied for long-term loans (see Table 4.6). 
Second, our sample households are heterogeneous in terms of main income generating activities, 
thus it is complicated to form an output supply model. Finally, in our sample, some households 
borrowed money for their children’s tertiary study and they only have to pay back four years after 
their children graduate. Petrick’s model cannot capture the willingness-to-pay of these households 
because it depends on the expected income their children will receive rather than the production 
yield.   
3.2. Empirical models 
3.2.1. Model for identifying factors influencing credit constraint status of rural 
farm households 
Since the dependent variable in the model for identifying determinants of credit constraints is 
binary, either logit or probit model is preferred over linear probability model because the linear 
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probability model cannot assure the probability value is in the range between 0 and 1 (Hill, 
Griffiths, & Lim, 2011). The difference between logit and probit model is the assumption of 
random term distribution. The error term in logit model is assumed to have cumulative 
distribution while normally distributed in the probit model (Greene, 2003). However, in most 
cases, marginal probabilities and the predicted probabilities obtained from the two models exhibit 
little differences (Hill et al., 2011). In this study, we choose logit model because of its simplicity and 
the availability of odds ratios which is not available with the probit model. In addition, the probit 
model is the first step of endogenous switching regression model used to measure the impact of 
credit constraints on rural farm household welfare. Therefore, we can compare the results of the 
two models later. Since our survey covers both credit constrained borrowers and credit 
constrained non-borrowers, selectivity bias is not a major concern, thus we do not need to apply 
two stage procedure suggested by Heckman (1979). According to Wooldridge (2002), the use of 
two stage procedure in this case results in large standard errors. 
The credit constraint condition of the borrower 𝑖𝑖 is defined by: 
  1    0
0   
i iCC if CC Z
CC otherwise
α ε= = +
=
≥        (3.2) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is credit constraint status of the household which is equal to 1 if the household is credit 
constrained, zero otherwise; 𝑍𝑍 is a vector of the household head, household and geography 
characteristics; 𝜀𝜀 is error term; 𝛼𝛼 is parameter to be estimated. The probability the household is 
credit constrained or 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 1 can be written as:  
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And the probability that the household is credit unconstrained or 0CC =  is: 
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+
      (3.4) 
Odds ratios and marginal effects will also be calculated after estimating equation (3.2). Odds ratio 
represents the change in odds of an outcome given one unit change in an independent variable, 
holding all other variables constant. Odds of an outcome is the ratio of probability that an event 
occurs to the probability that event does not occur. In this study, an odds ratio means the change 
in odds that a household is credit constrained given one unit change in an explanatory variable, 
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holding all other variables constant. Let Ω(Z) denotes odds that a household is credit constrained 
given independent variable Z. Ω(Z) can be expressed as:  
 Pr( 1/ Z) Pr( 1/ Z)(Z)
Pr(CC 0 / Z) 1 Pr(CC 1/ Z)
CC CC= =
Ω = =
= − =
      (3.5) 
The odds ratio is: 
            
Pr( 1/ Z 1)
Pr(CC 0 / Z 1)
( ) exp( )
Pr(CC 1/ Z)
Pr(CC 0 / Z)
CC
Z α
= +
= +Ψ = =
=
=
      (3.6) 
Odds ratios reveal the relationship between the dependent (probability of being credit 
constrained) and independent variables (Z). If an odds ratio is larger than 1, there is a positive 
relationship between the dependent and independent variable and vice versa. If an odds ratio is 
equal to 1, it can be concluded that the independent variable has no effect on the probability the 
event occurs.  
Marginal effects reflect the change in probability that a household is credit constrained given one 
unit change in the independent variables. Different from odds ratios, marginal effects are not 
constant, as the relationship between the probability that a household is credit constrained and an 
explanatory variable is non-linear. Popularly, the marginal effects are calculated at the mean of the 
independent variables. The limitation of this measure is that the mean value might not correspond 
to any observed values (Long, 1997). Therefore, in this study we only use marginal effects to 
compare the effect magnitude of the independent variables. Moreover, only marginal effects of 
continuous variables are computed as marginal effects of dummy variables may not be meaningful 
(Peng, Lee, & Ingersoll, 2002).  
3.2.2. Model for measuring the impact of credit constraints on household welfare 
Although the impacts of credit constraints vary, in this study, we only consider the impact on 
household welfare. We do not evaluate the impact of credit constraints on productivity because of 
the heterogeneity of household production in the studied areas.  
3.2.2.1. Outcome indicators of welfare impact evaluation  
Household welfare can be measured by monetary and non-monetary indicators. Monetary 
indicators are more widely used in welfare analysis in general, while non-monetary indicators are 
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suitable for studies focusing on particular dimensions of welfare such as health or education 
(Coudouel, Hentschel, & Wodon, 2002). The most popular monetary indicators are income and 
consumption expenditure, in which consumption expenditure is considered to be the better 
indicator (Chaudhuri & Ravallion, 1994; Coudouel et al., 2002). Consumption expenditure is 
preferred since it can reflect actual “standard of living” while income is more likely to measure the 
opportunity for consumption, which is also affected by the household’s wealth and saving. In 
addition, incomes of households in developing economies fluctuate erratically due to the yield and 
price violation, while consumption expenditure is relatively stable. Therefore, consumption 
expenditure is a better indicator for the household’s long-term well-being (Coudouel et al., 2002; 
Ravallion, 1992).  
Since the households vary in terms of size and composition, total household consumption 
expenditure is criticised to overstate welfare of large sized households, thus, an adjusted indicator 
is required. Per capita consumption expenditure is commonly used to correct household size 
difference but it fails to adjust composition deviation. A number of studies suggest the application 
of equivalence scales which take into account of the difference in consumption expenditure 
among age and gender groups. Although individual welfare is more accurately measured by 
applying equivalent scales adjustment, it requires information of each individual’s consumption 
demand, and the way resources are allocated to each individual in the family (Laderchi, Saith, & 
Stewart, 2003). There is no consensus among the methods used to calculate such scales which 
leads to the inconsistency in the results (Glewwe & Van der Gaag, 1990; Laderchi et al., 2003). 
Pollak and Wales (1979) also cast the aspersions on the feasibility and meaningfulness of the 
adjustment for household demographic profile in household welfare comparison as a reference for 
welfare programs. Due to the complexity and controversy of the equivalent scale approach, we 
only consider the difference in household size by using the per capita indicator which assumes all 
members in the households have equal consumption levels. The study of Glewwe and Van der 
Gaag (1990) confirms that in some cases results obtained from the use of per capita consumption 
and adjusted per capita consumption are only slightly different.  
In summary, compared to income, consumption expenditure is a preferred indicator for household 
welfare. To adjust for household size difference, per capita consumption expenditure should be 
applied. Although this indicator cannot compare welfare among individuals from different 
household compositions, there are lack of persuasive evidences that it generates less accurate 
results than equivalence scale adjusted indicators.   
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3.2.2.2. Empirical model for measuring the impact of credit constraints on household 
welfare 
Khandker, Koolwal, and Samad (2010) summarise six impact evaluation methods for development 
programmes in which Propensity Score Matching (PSM), Double difference (DD) and Instrumental 
variable (IV) are widely applied. Another popular method is Endogenous Switching Regression 
(ESR) model. Since our data is cross-sectional, we cannot apply DD method. PSM method can be a 
good choice for cross-sectional data (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002), however, the method still suffers 
from bias due to insufficient data of control group (Khandker et al., 2010). Since our study is non-
experimental and the sample size is rather small, seeking for sufficient credit unconstrained 
observations which are best matched with credit constrained observations is challenging. 
Therefore, PSM method is not supported by the data. IV can effectively solve the selection bias 
induced by both observable and unobservable factors.  Nonetheless, Carrasco (2001) and Dubin 
and Rivers (1989) argue that the IV which is popularly estimated by two stage least square method 
(2SLS) is not a good choice since our endogenous variable is discrete while the first step in 2SLS 
model treat endogenous variables as continuous variables. In addition, the application of IV 
requires the availability of at least an appropriate instrumental variable which is questioned by 
Maddala (1977, p. 154) “where you get such a variable”.  
In this study, we choose ESR model to address selection bias and endogeneity. The choice of ESR 
model is supported by Kiefer (1978), Poirier and Ruud (1981), Maddala (1983a) and Mare and 
Winship (1987). The model is also used by previous studies on the impact of credit constraints 
(Baiyegunhi et al., 2010; Dong et al., 2010; Foltz, 2004; Freeman et al., 1998). An advantage of ESR 
model is the ability to capture both direct and indirect effect, although it is unable to measure the 
magnitude of the direct effect. According to Maddala (1983b), the usual exclusion restrictions or 
instrumental variables are not required when there are enough observations in the selection 
equation, but there should be at least one exogenous variable excluded from the outcome 
equations so that the parameters of the outcome equations can be identified. Hamilton and 
Nickerson (2003) argue that in the absence of instrumental variables the model still suffers from 
bias caused by unobserved factors. However, the problem is how we evaluate the appropriateness 
of instrumental variables when there is lack of available tests for the validity of instrumental 
variables specified for ESR model. In the study of García Pérez and Rebollo Sanz (2005) and Neal 
(1995), the authors only test the strength of instrumental variables by Likelihood Ratio test. 
Further, García Pérez and Rebollo Sanz (2005) admit the lack of over-identification test. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is no study conducting the test for the exogeneity of instrumental 
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variables particularly for two step switching models. 
The Endogenous Switching Regression model can be expressed as follow (Maddala, 1986): 
1 1 1 1i i iY Xδ ε= +         iff  1CC = (3.7-1)
0 0 0 0i i iY Xδ ε= +        iff  0CC = (3.7-2) 
Where 𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖 and 𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖 represent the welfare function of credit constrained and unconstrained 
households respectively; 𝑋𝑋 is a set of explanatory variables; 𝛿𝛿1and 𝛿𝛿2 are vectors of parameters; 
𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖 and 𝜀𝜀0𝑖𝑖 are error terms. We assume 𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖, 𝜀𝜀0𝑖𝑖 and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  (in equation (3.2)) are normally distributed 
and have covariate matrix: 
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where 𝜎𝜎12, 𝜎𝜎02 are variances of the error terms in equation (3.7-1) and (3.7-2); 𝜌𝜌1𝜀𝜀 and 𝜌𝜌0𝜀𝜀 are 
correlation terms between the household’s credit constraint status in equation (3.2) and the 
welfare impact in equation (3.7-1) and (3.7-2); 𝜌𝜌10 is correlation terms between equation (3.7-1) 
and (3.7-2) (𝜌𝜌10 does not occur in all times (Maddala, 1983a)). If 𝜌𝜌1𝜀𝜀 = 𝜌𝜌0𝜀𝜀 = 0, it can be 
concluded that there is no problem with selection bias in the welfare impact model and the model 
can be estimated by Ordinary Least Square method. However, if 𝜌𝜌1𝜀𝜀 or 𝜌𝜌0𝜀𝜀 is different from zero, 
the model suffers from selection bias. This means the expected value of the error terms 𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖 or 𝜀𝜀0𝑖𝑖 
are different from zero, leading to inconsistent estimates from the OLS estimation. As suggested 
by (Lee, 1978), a two stage method is used where expected values of the error terms 𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖 and 𝜀𝜀0𝑖𝑖 
are: 
(3.8-1) 
where 𝜙𝜙 and Φ are the probability density function and the cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal, respectively. 𝛼𝛼𝑍𝑍𝚤𝚤�  is fitted value of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 calculated by estimating equation (3.2). The 
(3.8-2) 
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ratios 𝜙𝜙/Φ in equation (3.8-1) and (3.8-2) are inverse Mills ratio terms, which can be written as: 
 (3.9-1) 
 (3.9-2) 
Including 𝜆𝜆1𝑖𝑖 and 𝜆𝜆0𝑖𝑖 in equation (3.7-1) and (3.7-2) yields: 
1 1 1 1 1 1 vi i i iY X εδ σ λ ++= iff     1CC = (3.10-1)
0 0 0 0 0 0 vi i i iY X εδ σ λ= + + iff     0CC = (3.10-2)
where 1v i  and 0v i  are new error terms having zero expected value. Equation (3.10-1) and (3.10-2)
are estimated by weighted least squares as 1v i  and 0v i  are heteroscedastic. The set of explanatory
variables in equation (3.10-1) and (3.10-2) will be the same with the set of independent variable in 
equation (3.2) except an exclusion restriction as suggested by Maddala (1983b). The choice of 
explanatory variables will be discussed in Chapter 4.    
Based on the value of 𝜌𝜌1𝜀𝜀 ,𝜌𝜌0𝜀𝜀 and Likelihood Ratio test obtained from estimating ESR model, we 
can determine whether ESR model is appropriate. If 𝜌𝜌1𝜀𝜀 or 𝜌𝜌0𝜀𝜀 is significantly different from zero 
and the Likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that exogenous is better than endogenous, 
then the use of ESR model is necessary to address selection bias. Otherwise, OLS will be applied 
since the selection bias is not a major concern. 
3.3. Data 
3.3.1. Questionnaire design 
The questionnaire was designed to collect information related to credit status of rural farm 
household as well as household demographic characteristics, income and expenditure. 
Furthermore, the households were asked to give their opinion on the operation of formal credit 
institutions and the impact of credit constraints on household production and consumption. The 
questionnaire comprises of four sections.  
The first section contains a series of questions aiming to detect credit constraint status of the 
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surveyed households. Apart from key aforementioned questions discussed in section 3.1.2, we add 
two questions “How much did you need to borrow in 2012” and “how much did you actually 
borrow in 2012”. The answers to these two questions would also confirm the household’s credit 
constraint status. In addition, this section is designed to obtain the information of the household’s 
behaviour towards formal credit constraints.  
The second section consists of questions related to the household’s borrowing status. The 
households are asked to provide details of the loan they received in 2012, such as the purpose of 
loan, interest rate, loan duration, payment schedule, and loan status. In this section, the 
difficulties faced by households, the fees they had to pay and assistances they were offered during 
the loan application process would be revealed. Only households receiving loans in 2012 are 
required to complete this section.  
The third section comprises of a series of Likert scale questions focusing on the household’s 
perception of the impact of credit constraints on their production and consumption. Additional 
aim of this section is to study the extent the households were satisfied with formal creditor’s 
services. Further, the household’s expected loan terms would be uncovered in this section.  
Questions of household’s demographics, income and expenditure are presented in the last 
section. Besides age, gender, education, and occupation of household heads, house size and 
composition, the household’s main source of income, consumption and production expenditure 
and savings are important information acquired from this section.  
3.3.2. Data collection 
3.3.2.1. Sample technique 
Farm households in rural Vietnam North Central coast region is the target group of our study. The 
region comprises of six provinces Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, Quang Tri, Thua 
Thien Hue. A survey at household level was conducted in three provinces out of the six identified 
provinces. The sample households were selected using multi-staged stratified random sampling 
technique. In the first stage, three provinces namely Ha Tinh, Nghe An and Thua Thien Hue which 
are representatives of low, medium and high income per capita groups, respectively, were chosen. 
In the next stage, two districts from Nghe An (Yen Thanh and Thanh Chuong) were randomly 
selected while only one district was selected from Thua Thien Hue (Huong Thuy) and Ha Tinh 
(Thach Ha) because we would like to compare the likelihood of being credit constrained among 
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the households in the same and different provinces. From the lists of communes1 provided by the 
District People Committees, a commune from each district was also randomly selected. However, 
we exclude communes with no agriculture activity from the random lists. As a result, four 
communes namely Van Thanh, Thanh Yen, Thach Tien and Thuy Thanh were chosen from four 
districts Yen Thanh, Thanh Chuong, Thach Ha and Huong Thuy, respectively. 
In the final stage, the sample households were randomly selected from the list of households 
provided by the Commune People Committees. Similarly, only farm households were included in 
the list. A total of 550 households were interviewed, yielding 479 usable questionnaires (87.1%). 
3.3.2.2. Sample size 
The sample size was determined by the formula suggested by Cochran (1977): 
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e
=           (3. 11)                                                                   
Where 𝑛𝑛0  is sample size 
2z is the abscissa of the normal curve that cuts off an area at the tails 
e  is the desired level of precision 
p is the estimated proportion of an attribute that is present in the population 
q  is 1 - p  
The level of confidence is determined to be at 95% where 𝑧𝑧=1.96 and e=0.05. p is assumed to be 
0.5 (q  =0.5). The sample size determined by the standard Cochran formula is 385 farm households. 
However, 550 households were interviewed to assure the required number of completed and valid 
questionnaires.  
3.3.2.3. Pretest  
Following Zikmund’s (2013) suggestion, a pre-test of 30 rural farm households was conducted in 
Thanh Yen commune to obtain feedback to improve the instruction, clarity, wording, possible bias 
caused by the content of the questions and layout of questionnaire. The comments from each 
participant from the pre-test sample were taken into consideration to amend the questionnaire 
1 Commune is the lowest administrative unit in Vietnam which is a subdivision of a district. 
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before the survey questionnaire was administered to the selected respondents. The final version 
of questionnaire is attached in Appendix B.  
3.4. Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we analyse the methods used to identify credit constrained households and the 
category of credit constraint they belong to. In spite of its drawbacks, Direct Elicitation Method is 
the optimal choice since it enables to accurately categorise the household’s credit constraint 
status and determine the causes of credit constraints. In addition, the empirical models used to 
identify the determinants of credit constraints and to evaluate the impact of credit constraints are 
specified. Logit model is selected to classify the profile of households who are more likely to be 
credit constrained. The effect of credit constraints on the household welfare is evaluated by the 
Endogenous Switching Regression model.   
Data for analysis was collected from the survey conducted in three out of six identified provinces 
in North Central Coast region of Vietnam. Multi-staged stratified random sampling technique was 
applied to choose the sample households. A four-section questionnaire was developed to obtain 
information related to the household’s credit constraint status; the characters of their loan; their 
behaviour towards and perception of credit constraints as well as their impacts; and the 
household demographic profiles. The questionnaire was pilot tested on 30 rural farm households 
for revision. A total of 550 farm households were interviewed, yielding 479 usable questionnaires.  
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Chapter 4 
Descriptive Statistic and Empirical Results 
This Chapter describes the NCC household survey data and reports the empirical results from the 
logit and Endogenous Switching Regression (ESR) models. Section 4.1 presents the profiles of the 
surveyed rural farm households in terms of credit constraint status, demographics, socio-economic 
and loan characteristics. Section 4.2 discusses the determinants of credit constraints obtained 
from the logit model and the impact of credit constraints on household welfare from the ESR 
model. Section 4.3 summarises the chapter. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
This section provides an overview of the surveyed household’s credit constraint status, followed 
by the household’s characteristics and the characteristics of household’s loans. The descriptive 
statistics aim to clarify the differences in characteristics of the credit constrained and 
unconstrained households. The descriptive statistics also justify the selection of the explanatory 
variables used in the logit model. In addition, the characteristics of informal and formal credit in 
the surveyed area are presented and compared in this section.    
4.1.1 Credit constraint status of the NCC survey respondents 
Table 4.1 shows the credit constraint status of the surveyed households. According to the 
households’ survey responses, there were 310 households (64.72% of total surveyed households) 
seeking formal credit, in which 53 households were rejected by formal financial institutions. The 
main reason for their credit rejection was the lack of collateral (37 households). Other reasons 
included “not in the target groups of the bank” (6 households), “incurred previous loans” (2 
households), “lack of revenues” (6 households) and “inappropriate purpose” (5 households).  
Among the 257 households who successfully obtained formal loan, the survey result shows 89 
households did not receive sufficient amount of loan requested mainly because of the bank’s 
limitation (62 households) and lack of collateral (17 households). Further, 169 households who did 
not apply for formal credit, 52 households reported that they had demand for formal credit but 
they did not apply due to either administrative difficulties to process the loan (40 households) or 
fear of rejection (12 households) and the remaining households had no demand for credit (114 
households) or found a cheaper source of credit (3 households). Based on the information 
provided by the households and the Direct Elicitation framework suggested by Franklin et al. 
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(2008) and Boucher et al. (2009), 194 households were categorised to be credit constrained, 
accounting for 40.51% of the total surveyed households, in which 40 households were considered 
to be transaction cost constrained, the remaining were quantity constrained (154 households), 
constituting 32.15% of the total surveyed households. No household was identified to be risk 
constrained. This may be due to the fact that in rural Vietnam, when the households fail to pay 
their debts on due date, banks prefer to restructure their loans rather than to foreclose the 
household’s property because their property has low liquidity.   
Table 4.1 Reasons for Household’s formal credit constraint condition 
Description 
Credit application status  
Households who 
applied for formal 
credit 
Households who 
did not apply for 
formal credit 
Total 
Number of respondent households 310 (64.72%) 169 (35.28%) 479 (100%) 
Number of credit constrained households 142 (29.65 %) 52 (10.86 %) 194 (40.51%) 
Reason for formal credit constraints:    
• Constrained non-applicants and reason  52 (10.86 %)  
     - Administrative difficulties to process loan  40 (8.35%)  
     - Fear of being rejected  12 (2.51%)  
• Rejected applicants and reason  53 (11.06%)   
     - Rejected due to lack of collateral  37 (7.72%)   
     - Other reasons 16 (3.34%)   
• Non-rejected applicants who received  
insufficient amount and reason  89 (18.58%) 
  
    - Lack of collateral  17 (3.55%)   
    - The amount requested exceeded limitation  
       set by the bank 62 (12.94%) 
  
    - Reason other than those sited above  10 (2.09%)   
Source: Author’s calculations from the 2013 household survey 
The results reported in Table 4.1 confirms that a high proportion of the rural farm households had 
demand for formal credit (75.58%), but only 35.08% of the households were sufficiently satisfied 
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and 40.5% of the households were credit constrained. The rural farm households in NCC were 
more likely to be quantity and transaction cost constrained but less likely to be risk constrained.     
4.1.2 Characteristics of credit constrained and unconstrained households 
4.1.2.1 Household head characteristics 
Table 4.2 Profile of the NCC Survey Respondents (Household head characteristics) 
Characteristics 
Credit 
constrained 
households 
Credit 
unconstrained 
households 
All respondents Statistical       test 
 Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent  
Gender        
  Male  131 67.53 249 87.37 380 79.33 
   Female  63 32.47 36 12.63 99 20.67 
Total 194 100 285 100 479 100 𝜒𝜒2=27.72*** 
Marital status        
  Married 167 86.08 272 95.44 439 91.65  
  Other 27 13.92 13 4.56 40 8.35  
Total 194 100 285 100 194 100 𝜒𝜒2=13.02*** 
Age group        
  Below 35 25 12.89 20 7.02 45 9.39 
 
  35-45  70 36.08 94 32.98 164 34.24 
  45-55  71 36.60 107 37.54 178 37.16 
  Above 55  28 14.43 64 22.46 92 19.21 
Total 194 100 285 100 479 100 𝜒𝜒2=8.69* 
Education level        
  Primary school 18 9.28 22 7.72 40 8.35 
   Middle school 137 70.62 189 66.32 326 68.06 
  High school 36 18.56 74 24.21 105 21.92 
  Higher education 3 1.55 5 1.75 8 1.67  
Total 194 100 285 100 479 100 𝜒𝜒2=2.36 
Occupation        
  Crop farmer 93 47.94 86 30.18 179 37.37  
  Livestock and poultry raiser 5 2.58 6 2.11 11 2.30  
  Fisher folk 1 0.52 2 0.70 3 0.63  
  Trader 34 17.53 49 17.19 83 17.33  
  Government employee 0 0 25 8.77 25 5.22  
  Private sector worker 15 7.73 34 11.93 49 10.23  
  Handicraft 9 4.64 28 9.82 37 7.72  
  Mixed occupation 37 19.07 55 19.30 92 19.21  
Total 194 100 285 100 479 100 𝜒𝜒2=32.96*** 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively  
Source: Author’s survey data, 2013 
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The characteristics of the household heads of credit constrained and unconstrained groups are 
summarised in Table 4.2. The differences in terms of gender, marital status, age and occupation 
between the credit constrained and unconstrained households are statistically significant at 1% 
and 10% level. This indicates the household’s credit constraint status is associated with gender, 
marital status, age and occupation. Although the Chi square test implies weak relationship 
between education and credit constraint condition, the descriptive statistics show that the 
proportion of household heads who obtained high school degree or higher education in the credit 
unconstrained group is higher than that of the credit constrained group.  
Majority of the respondents were male accounting for 79.33%. It is common in rural Vietnam that 
males usually make important decisions since they are the main income earners. Although male 
constitutes the majority of the respondents, only 34.47% of them (138/380) was credit 
constrained. The percentage of the female respondents was 20.67%, however 63.64% of them 
(63/99) was found to be credit constrained. Thus, our result shows female was more likely to be 
credit constrained. 
Marital status is associated with the distribution of credit constrained and unconstrained groups. 
Although married respondents constitute the majority of both groups, the portion of married 
respondents in the unconstrained group was 7% higher than the constrained group. “Other” group 
including single, divorce and widow respondents showed higher probability of being credit 
constrained. 
The age of the respondents was categorised into four groups in which most of the respondents 
belonged to the age group of 35 to 55 years old. Table 4.2 shows that the percentage of credit 
constrained households descended with the increase in age. The proportion of the credit 
unconstrained respondents older than 45 years old was larger than that of the credit constrained 
counterparts. This means the older farmers are associated with lower likelihood to be credit 
constrained. 
All the surveyed respondents attained at least one form of education, where majority of them 
completed middle school as the highest education attained (68.06%). Although education 
attainment shows a weak association with credit constraint status, Table 4.2 exhibits the different 
pattern of the two groups in light of education level distribution. The proportion of the credit 
constrained respondents with primary and middle school was higher than that of the credit 
unconstrained respondents (9.28% and 70.62 versus 7.72% and 66.32%). On the contrary, the 
proportion of household heads with high school or higher education in the credit constrained 
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group was lower than that of the credit unconstrained group (18.56% and 1.55% versus 24.21% 
and 1.75%).   
The respondents’ occupations were classified into 8 groups including crop farmer, livestock and 
poultry raiser, fisher folk, trader, government employee, private sector worker, handicraft and 
mixed occupation. The descriptive statistics illustrate the credit constrained respondents were 
more likely to be engaged in agriculture related activities while the opposite was revealed for the 
credit unconstrained respondents. Noticeably, no government employees was credit constrained, 
which implies that government employees have advantage to access formal credit. The Chi square 
test is significant at 1% level, which implies that the occupation of the household head was 
strongly associated with the household’s likelihood to be credit constrained. 
In summary, the household’s credit constraint status can be explained by the characteristics of 
household heads. Households with male, older and married household heads who were less 
involved in agriculture based activities were less likely to be credit constrained. Although the Chi 
square test shows a weak relationship between the household head’s education and household’s 
credit constraint status, the descriptive statistics show a lower probability that the households 
with more educated household heads were credit constrained. 
4.1.2.2 Household characteristics  
The characteristics of the households, namely, household size, number of income earners, number 
of off-farm earners, number of children, land holding status, agricultural land size, poor status, 
household income and consumption expenditure are described in Table 4.3. Except for household 
size and land holding status, all characteristics exhibit statistical difference between the credit 
constrained and unconstrained groups.  
The average household size was approximately five members per household. Most households 
had four to six members (71.82%), only 5.22% of the households had more than 6 members. In 
comparison, the t-test shows insignificant difference between household size of the credit 
constrained and unconstrained groups in terms of average size and distribution. 
Majority of the surveyed households had one to two income earners. Only 26.52% of the 
households had more than two labours. Although the mean household size is not statistically 
different between the credit constrained and unconstrained households, the average number of 
income earners of the two groups is significantly different at 1% level. The proportion of the credit 
constrained households with more than two income earners was much lower than the credit 
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unconstrained counterparts (16.5% versus 33.33%). Similarly, another advantage of the credit 
unconstrained households over the constrained households in term of labour force is exhibited by 
the significant difference in the average number of off-farm labours at 1% level. Furthermore, 
22.16% of the credit constrained households had no off-farm labour compared to 11.58% in the 
credit unconstrained group. We can conclude that the credit unconstrained households had 
advantages over the constrained households in terms of labour force. 
The average number of children of the surveyed families was two children per household. More 
than half of the households had an average of one to two children (56.99%). The average number 
of children of the credit constrained group was significantly higher than the credit unconstrained 
group at 1% level. In addition, the percentage of the credit unconstrained households who did not 
have children was 13.33% which is much higher than the credit constrained group (2.58%), 
whereas, the proportion of the credit constrained households who had more than two children 
outnumbered the credit unconstrained group (41.23% versus 29.12%) (see Table 4.3). With 
relatively higher number of children, the credit constrained households tend to have more 
dependents, which implies they were more likely to be under financial stress.   
Our target group is farm households in the rural area, where majority of the households owned 
land, however, some of them also rented land out. The result shows 30% of the surveyed 
households both owned land and rented land and the proportion between the credit constrained 
and unconstrained groups differ slightly (29.9% versus 27.77%). In general, the Chi square test 
shows negligible difference between land holding status of the credit constrained and 
unconstrained households. Nevertheless, the difference in size of agricultural land between the 
two groups is statistically significant at 1% level. The average agricultural land size of the credit 
constrained group was 0.33 ha while the credit unconstrained group was 0.36 ha. Majority of the 
household’s land size was between 0.1 and 0.5 ha. Only 17% of the credit constrained households 
compared to 22.81% of the credit unconstrained households possessed more than 0.5 ha of 
agricultural land (see Table 4.3). Although agricultural land is rarely accepted as collateral in 
Vietnam, it can be a proxy for the household’s production capacity. 
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Table 4.3 Profile of the NCC Survey Respondents (Household characteristics) 
Characteristics 
Credit 
constrained 
households 
Credit 
unconstrained 
households 
All respondents Statistical 
test 
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent 
Household size        
  1-3 42 21.65 68 23.86 110 22.96    4-6 143 73.71 201 70.53 344 71.82 
  6 and more 9 4.64 16 5.61 25 5.22  
Total 194 100 285 100 479 100  
Mean household size 4.43  4.4  4.41  𝑡𝑡=-0.22 
Number of income earners        
  1-2 162 83.50 190 66.67 352 73.49  
  3-4 31 15.98 85 29.82 116 24.22  
  5 and more 1 0.52 10 3.51 11 2.3  
Total 194 100 285 100 479 100  
Mean income earners 2.11  2.48  2.33  𝑡𝑡=4.99*** 
Number of off-farm earners        
  None 43 22.16 33 11.58 76 15.87 
 
  1-2 148 76.29 233 81.75 381 79.54 
  3-4 3 1.55 17 5.96 20 4.18 
  5 and more 0 0 2 0.7 2 0.42 
  Total 194 100 285 100 479 100  
Mean off-farm earners 0.98  1.46  1.27  𝑡𝑡=6.44*** 
Number of children         
  None  5 2.58 38 13.33 43 8.98 
   1-2 109 56.19 164 57.54 273 56.99 
  3-4 74 38.14 79 27.72 153 31.94 
  5 and more 6 3.09 4 1.40 10 2.09  
Total 194 100 285 100 479 100  
Mean number of children 2.32  1.92  2.08  𝑡𝑡=-3.80*** 
Land holding status        
  Owner 136 70.10 203 71.23 339 70.77  
  Both owner and leasee 58 29.9 82 28.77 140 29.23  
Total 194 100 285 100 479 100 𝜒𝜒2=0.071 
Agricultural land size (ha)        
  Less than 0.1 9 4.64 20 7.02 29 6.05  
  0.1 to less than 0.5 152 78.35 200 70.18 352 73.49  
  0.5 to less than 1.0 28 14.43 46 16.14 74 15.45  
  1.0 and above 5 2.58 19 6.67 24 5.01  
Total 194 100 285 100 479 100  
Mean Agricultural land 0.33  0.38      0.36  𝑡𝑡=1.96** 
Poor certification        
  Poor certified households 71 36.60 28 9.82 99 20.67  
  Non-poor households 123 63.40 257 90.18 380 79.33  
Total  194 100 285 100 479 100 𝜒𝜒2=50.46*** 
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Characteristics 
Credit 
constrained 
households 
Credit 
unconstrained 
households 
All respondents Statistical 
test 
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent 
Household income (million VND)2      
  Less than 10 2 1.03 1 0.35 3 0.63  
  10 to less than 50 108 55.67 84 29.47 192 40.08  
  50 to less than 100 80 41.24 168 58.95 248 51.77  
  100 to less than 200 4 2.06 31 10.88 35 7.31  
  200 and above 0 0 1 0.35 1 0.21  
Total 194 100 285 100 479 100  
Mean household income  48.61  65.54  58.68  𝑡𝑡=6.24*** 
Household consumption expenditure (million VND)     
  Less than 20 6 3.09 2 0.70 8 1.67  
  20 to less than 40 89 45.88 71 24.91 160 33.40  
  40 to less than 80 99 51.03 207 72.63 306 63.88  
  80 and above 0 0 5 1.75 5 1.04  
Total 194 100 285 100 479 100  
Mean consumption 
expenditure 40.31 
 48.02  44.89  𝑡𝑡=6.42*** 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively  
Source: Author’s survey data, 2013 
 
  
2 Exchange rate in 2013: 1 USD = 21,000 VND 
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Table 4.3 illustrates the large income gap between the credit constrained households and credit 
unconstrained households which is statistically significant at 1% level. The average annual income 
of the credit constrained households was 48.61 million VND which was much lower than average 
annual income of the credit unconstrained households (65.54 million VND). Further, majority of 
the credit constrained households earned between10 to 50 million VND (55.67%) while most of 
the credit unconstrained households belonged to the group earning from 50 to 100 million VND.  
The result shows more than 10% of the credit unconstrained households have income of more 
than 100 million VND compared to 2.06% of the credit constrained households. However, the 
correlation between income and the household’s credit constraint status should be interpreted 
with caution since there may be a mutually causal relationship between them.   
Similar to annual income, there was a wide gap in consumption expenditure between the credit 
constrained and unconstrained households. The deviation of annual consumption expenditure 
between the two groups is statistically significant at 1% level. The proportion of the credit 
unconstrained households spending from 40 to 80 million VND was 72.63% compared to 51.03% 
of the credit constrained households. The remaining portion of the credit constrained households 
(48.97%) spent less than 40 million VND annually on consumption. Although the household 
consumption expenditure indicator does not take into account of household size, however, as 
discussed above there was no difference in household size between the two groups, thus, it is 
rationale to conclude that consumption per capita of the credit unconstrained households was 
significantly higher than that of the credit constrained households.  
Table 4.3 also reveals the credit constraint status of the poor households in the surveyed areas. 
Among the 99 households certified as the poor, 71 households were identified to be credit 
constrained, only 28 households were credit unconstrained. The significance of the Chi square test 
at 1% level indicates the poor households were more likely to fall into the credit constrained 
group.  
In summary, the descriptive statistics provide an overview of the household’s characteristics in the 
surveyed area and reveal the differences between the credit constrained and unconstrained 
households in terms of household size, number of income earners and off-farm earners, number 
of children, land holding status and agricultural land size, household poor status, household 
income and expenditure. In general, the credit unconstrained households had more income 
earners and off-farm labours, larger agricultural land size, fewer children and were less likely to be 
poor. They also had higher income and consumption expenditure. However, the relationship 
between the credit constraint status and the household income and expenditure is inconclusive 
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since the relationship between the credit constraint status and the household economic outcomes 
may be mutual.  
4.1.2.3 Geography related factors 
Table 4.4 shows the geographic distribution of the credit constrained and unconstrained 
households in the surveyed area. Among the four communes namely Van Thanh, Thanh Yen, 
Thach Tien and Thuy Thanh randomly selected from three provinces in NCC region, the highest 
proportion of the credit constrained households inhabited in Van Thanh (32.47%) which is also the 
commune with the highest poverty rate (14.7%).  
Table 4.4 Geography related characteristics in the surveyed area 
Characteristics Poverty rate(A)  
Credit constrained 
households 
Credit 
unconstrained 
households 
All respondents Statistical 
test 
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent 
Geographic characteristics       
  Van Thanh   14.7 63 32.47 58 20.35 121 25.26    Thanh Yen 11.5 51 26.29 66 23.16 117 24.43 
  Thach Tien 13.1 55 28.35 67 23.51 122 25.47  
  Thuy Thanh 7.5 25 12.89 94 32.98 119 24.84  
Total  194 100 285 100 479 100 𝜒𝜒2=27.01*** 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1 %, respectively 
(A)The commune poverty rate was obtained from the interviews with commune officials at the 
survey sites.  
Source: Author’s survey data, 2013 
 
Conversely, the proportion of the credit constrained households living in Thuy Thanh, the 
commune with the lowest poverty rate was much lower than other communes (12.89%). As 
discussed above, the poor households had higher propensity to be credit constrained, thus, the 
communes with high poverty rate is more likely to have higher rate of credit constrained 
households. 
The Chi square test is significant at 1% level, confirming the difference in the likelihood to be credit 
constrained of the households living in different geographical locations. However from Table 4.4, it 
is unclear to ascertain which location exhibits the highest likelihood that the households were 
credit constrained. The influence of geographical characteristics should be considered with other 
household’s characteristics.  
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4.1.3 Characteristics of rural credit  
This section provides an overview of the characteristics of formal and informal credit in the 
surveyed area. Table 4.5 illustrates the borrowing status of the surveyed households and the 
sources of their credit in 2012. The results showed 69.52% of the households borrowed from at 
least one source of credit in 2012, the remaining 30.48% did not borrow from any source. Among 
the borrowing households, 39.67% of the households received credit only from formal credit 
institutions, 20.46% of the households obtained loan from two sources and 9.39% accessed only 
informal credit. Non-borrower households accounted for 30.48% of the total interviewed 
households, in which 6.68% of the households could not access any credit due to credit 
constraints.   
Table 4.5 Borrowing status of the surveyed households 
Source: Author’s survey data, 2013 
The data (see Table 4.5) confirms the dependence of the rural farm households on credit. Results 
from our survey indicate that only 23.80% of the households could self-finance their production 
and consumption, 76.20% of the households needed some form of external financial support. In 
addition, the survey affirms the prevalence of formal financial institutions in providing credit to the 
rural farm households. According to the survey results, the proportion of the households involved 
in formal credit accounted for 60.63% and formal credit was the only source of finance for 39.67% 
of the households. However, we cannot deny the importance of informal creditors who provided 
credit to more than 30% of the rural farm households and the only source of credit for 9.39% of 
the households. These results share many similarities with the statistics of Vietnam rural 
household’s borrowing discussed in Chapter 2 and the survey conducted by Barslund and Tarp 
(2008). 
Description 
Source of loans 
Total 
Formal Informal  Mixed formal and Informal 
Borrower households 190 (39.67%) 45 (9.39%) 98 (20.46%) 333 (69.52%) 
Non-borrowers households   146 (30.48%)  
- Credit constrained Non-borrowers     32 (6.68%) 32 (6.68%) 
- Credit unconstrained Non-borrowers    114 (23.80%) 114 (23.80%) 
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Table 4.6 summarises the characteristics of formal and informal credit in terms of loan value, 
interest rate, the processing time, loan duration, repayment procedure and loan purpose. In 
general, formal credit institutions offered higher amount of loan, lower interest rate, provided 
more long term and medium term loans but were more rigid in repayment schedule and spent 
more time on loan processing.  
In light of loan value, the amount of loan provided by formal financial institutions and informal 
creditors were divided into 5 categories: less than 10 million VND, from 10 million to less than 30 
million VND, from 30 million to less than 50 million VND, from 50 million to less than 100 million 
VND and 100 million VND and above. Majority of the households received loans valued from 10 to 
less than 30 million VND from either formal creditors (45.49%) or informal creditors (53.85%) (see 
Table 4.6). In comparison, a larger proportion of the households obtained loan valued 50 million 
VND or above from formal credit institution than from informal creditors. This means formal credit 
institutions are still the main providers of large loans to rural farm households. The average value 
of formal loan was 35.06 million VND which was bigger than the average value of informal loan 
(25.67 million VND). In fact, formal credit is dominant in Vietnam rural credit market in terms of 
coverage and loan size.  
As expected, the interest rate charged by informal creditors was much higher than formal financial 
institutions. It is understandable since formal loan is subsidised by the government. Our results are 
similar to the findings of Barslund and Tarp (2008) and Pham and Lensink (2007). Most of the 
households paid an interest rate of less than 1% per month for formal loan (70.49%) whereas 
majority of the households was charged an interest rate of 1.5% per month or above by informal 
creditors (73.42%). Further, more than 30% of the households paid an interest rate of 2% per 
month or above for informal loan. On average, interest rate applied to informal loan was 2.3 times 
higher than average interest rate charged by formal loan providers (1.98% versus 0.86%) (see 
Table 4.6). With regards to the effect of subsidised credit, some studies (for example Hoff and 
Stiglitz (1998) and Bose (1998)) raise the concerns that while some households benefit from low 
interest rate, others would suffer from increase in interest rate charged by moneylenders. The 
expansion of subsidised credit results in the downsizing of money lenders as the market becomes 
more risky for them. As a consequence, interest rate in the informal sector would be pushed up. In 
fact, only households who are not constrained by formal financial institutions are beneficiaries of 
subsidised credit, whereas credit constrained households may suffer from negative effect of such 
subsidised programs since they are forced to borrow from informal sources. According to Ghate 
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(1992), high interest rate charged by rural moneylenders do not necessarily reflect monopoly but 
actual risk of the market.   
With regards to loan duration, most of the households (87.85%) were offered medium and long 
term loans by formal creditors, where 12.05% of the households borrowed short term. 
Meanwhile, majority of the households borrowing from the informal sector received short term 
loans (67.83%) (see Table 4.6). This is because informal credit is much more expensive than formal 
credit, the households may be able to handle informal debt in a short term basis while prefer to 
keep formal loan in medium and long term.  
Table 4.6 also exhibits the difference in loan processing time between formal and informal credit. 
The survey result shows 55.24% of the borrowers waited for less than a day to receive loans from 
informal creditors. The remaining borrowers waited for less than a week (28.67%) or a month 
(16.8%) by informal creditors. No informal loan was processed for more than a month. On the 
contrary, more than half of the formal loans were processed for more than a week (54.17%) and 
5.56% of the loans were processed for more than a month. Only 1.39% of the formal loans was 
processed within a day. The longer loan processing time implies higher transaction cost. This 
means the households bear more transaction cost when they borrow from the formal sector. 
The payment schedule described in Table 4.6 refers to interest payment schedule. In Vietnam, 
loan principles are usually paid on the due date while interests are paid periodically. Table 4.6 
shows that the households paid interest monthly (37.15%), quarterly (28.82%) or annually 
(30.56%) when they borrowed from formal financial institutions based on their loan duration and 
the creditors’ regulations. The informal creditors required the households to pay interest monthly 
(36.36%) or annually (30.07%). Some households (33.57%) were offered flexible interest payment 
schedule. The interest payment schedule of formal credit is regulated and rigid while households 
can compromise with informal lenders on both payment schedule and duration. 
The main purposes of the formal and informal loans are illustrated in Table 4.6. Agricultural 
production was chosen by most of the households as the main purpose they borrowed from 
formal financial institutions (68.75%), followed by paying tuition fee (38.54%) small investment 
(27.43%) and house repair (18.06%). Similarly, informal loans were used for agricultural production 
(20.98%), small investment/trade (18.88%), and house repair (18.88%). The households also used 
informal loan to pay other loans while only a few of them used formal loan for that purpose.    
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Table 4.6 Characteristics of formal and informal credit in the surveyed area 
Informal loan characteristics 
Informal credits 
Formal loan characteristics 
Formal credit 
Count Frequency Count Frequency 
Informal loan value (in million VND)   Formal loan value (in million VND)   
     Less than 10 7 4.90      Less than 10 10 3.47 
     From 10 to less than 30 77 53.85      From 10 to less than 30 131 45.49 
     From 30 to less than 50 47 32.87      From 30 to less than 50 76 26.39 
     From 50  to less than 100 11 7.69      From 50 to less than 100 59 20.49 
     100 and above 1 0.70      100 and above  12 4.17 
Mean 25.67  35.06 
Informal interest rate (%/month)   Formal interest rate (%/month)   
     Less than 1% 25 17.48      Less than 1% 203 70.49 
     From 1% to less than 1.5% 26 18.18      From 1% to less than 1.5% 80 27.78 
     From 1.5% to less than 2% 62 43.35      From 1.5% to less than 2% 5 1.74 
     2% and above 43 30.07    
Mean 1.98      Mean 0.86 
Informal loan duration (months)   Formal loan duration   
     Short term (up to 12 month) 97 67.83      Short term (up to 12 month) 35 12.15 
     Medium term (more than 12 and up to 36 month) 38 26.57      Medium term (more than 12 and up to 36 month) 214 74.31 
     Long term (More than 36 month)  8 5.59      Long term (More than 36 month) 39 13.54 
     Mean  17.45      Mean 39.55 
Processing time for informal loan    Processing time for formal loan   
     Within a day 79 55.24      Within a day 4 1.39 
     Less than a week 41 28.67      Less than a week 112 38.89 
     More than a week and less than a month 23 16.08      More than a week and less than a month 156 54.17 
        More than a month 16 5.56 
                                               (Table 4.6 continued next page) 
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Informal loan characteristics 
Informal credits 
Formal loan characteristics 
Formal credit 
Count Frequency Count Frequency 
Payment schedule for informal loan   Payment schedule for formal loan   
     Monthly  52 36.36      Monthly  107 37.15 
     Annually 43 30.07      Quarterly 83 28.82 
     Others 48 33.57      Semi-annually 10 3.47 
        Annually 88 30.56 
Loan purposes   Loan purposes   
     Production capital (Farming) 30 20.98      Production capital (Farming) 198 68.75 
     Small investment/trade 27 18.88      Small investment/trade 79 27.43 
     Pay tuition fee 10 6.99      Pay tuition fee 111 38.54 
     Emergencies 9 6.29      Emergencies 10 3.47 
     House repair 27 18.88      House repair 52 18.06 
     Purchase durable assets 14 9.79      Purchase durable assets 13 4.51 
     Payment of other loans 22 15.38      Payment of other loans 6 2.08 
     Others 7 4.90      Others 18 6.25 
Source: Author’s survey data, 2013 
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 4.2 Empirical results 
This section presents the empirical results obtained from the logit and Endogenous Switching 
Regression models. The specification of each model will be discussed, followed by the result 
analysis and discussions. 
4.2.1 Determinants of household’s credit constraint status 
4.2.2.1 Definitions of the explanatory variables used in the Logit model  
The logit model used to identify the factors influencing the NCC household’s credit constraint 
status is specified in equation (3.2). Household’s credit constraint status is a function of the 
household head’s characteristics, characteristics of households and geographic related factors. The 
household head characteristics include age (AGE), education (EDU) and gender (GENDER).  
Agricultural land size (LANDSIZE), the ratio of income earners to total household members 
(LARATIO), number of off-farm labours (OFFFARM) and the ratio of income from non-farm 
activities to total household income (INRATIO) represent the characteristics of the households. 
VANTHANH, THACHTIEN, THUYTHANH are dummy geography variables to capture the location 
characteristics. We also add two dummy variables namely poor certificate (POOR) and household’s 
credit demand (DEMANDUM) to examine the effectiveness of the subsidised credit institutions in 
implementing the government policy.    
According to previous studies, age (Barslund & Tarp, 2008; Chaudhuri & Cherical, 2011), gender 
(Freeman et al., 1998; Zeller, 1994) and education (Jia et al., 2010; Pham & Izumida, 2002) are the 
main characteristics of household head affecting household’s likelihood of being credit 
constrained. In our study, age is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the household head is 
more than 55 years old and 0 otherwise. Education is also a discrete variable which equals 1 if the 
household head completed high school or higher education, 0 otherwise. Agricultural land size 
variable is a proxy of the household physical capital. The ratio of income earners is an indicator of 
the household human capital. The role of number of off-farm labours variable is twofold: it can be 
a proxy of the household human capital and also an indicator of the household economic 
characteristics. The households with more off-farm labours are expected to be less dependent on 
credit. Another household economic related variable is income ratio. As reported by Stampini and 
Davis (2009), non-farm income helps to relax credit rationing on farm households. In terms of 
geography variables, our survey covers four areas THANHYEN and VANTHANH (Nghe An), 
THACHTIEN (Ha Tinh) and THUYTHANH (Thua Thien Hue). THANHYEN has a higher poverty rate 
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 than HUONGTHUY, but lower poverty rate than THACHTIEN, and the same provincial location with 
VANTHANH, therefore, it is used as the reference geography dummy variable in the logit model.  
Table 4.7 Determinants of the household’s credit constraint status in the NNC 
Note: † A total of 477 observations was used, 2 observations were excluded for the concern of 
outliers. Appendix A-1 provides the evidence of outliers.  
Source: Author’s survey data, 2013 
The presence of poor certificate (POOR) variable examines whether the poor households can 
access sufficient formal credit as expected by the government’s subsidy policy. In addition, we add 
the dummy variable DEMANDUM which equals 1 if the households need to borrow more than 30 
million VND and 0 otherwise. This enables us to test whether the loan size of 30 million VND set by 
the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies can meet the farm household’s demand for credit.  
Details of the explanatory variables are described in Table 4.7. We exclude two observations from 
the data analysis for the fear of outliers which may increase the sample variance and reduce the 
precision of the estimations (Cochran, 1977). 
Variables Description Mean S.D. Min Max 
CONSTRAINED 1 if household is credit constrained,  
0 = unconstrained 
0.40 0.49 0 1 
GENDER 1 if household head is male, 0 = female 0.79 0.40 0 1 
AGE 1 if household head is older than 55;  
0 = otherwise 
0.19 0.39 0 1 
EDU 1 if household head gets high school 
degree or higher, 0 = otherwise 
0.24 0.42 0 1 
DEMANDDUM 1 if the amount of loan household 
needed to borrow is larger than 30 
million VND, 0 = otherwise 
0.41 0.49 0 1 
LANDSIZE Size of household farm land (1000m2) 3.63 2.69 0.3 20 
INRATIO Ratio of non-farm income to farm 
income 
1.99 2.34 0 18 
LARATIO Ratio of labours to total family members 0.55 0.19 0.25 1 
OFFFARM Number of off-farm labours 1.27 0.83 0 5 
POOR 1 if household has poor certificate,  
0 =  otherwise 
0.20 0.40 0 1 
VANTHANH Geography dummy variable 0.25 0.43 0 1 
THACHTIEN Geography dummy variable 0.25 0.43 0 1 
THUYTHANH Geography dummy variable 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Number of observations 477†   
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 4.2.2.2   Determinants of credit constraints 
 Table 4.8 presents the determinants of the household’s credit constraint status, including the 
parameter estimates, odd ratios and marginal effect. The VIF test (mean VIF=1.49) confirms the 
absence of multicollinearity from the model. High p value (p=0.30) obtained from Hosmer-
Lemeshow’s goodness of fit test indicates the model is well-fitted with the data (Janosz, LeBlanc, 
Boulerice, & Tremblay, 1997). Details of the VIF and Hosmer-Lemeshow’s goodness of fit tests are 
presented in Appendix A-2 and Appendix A-3, respectively. The percentage of observations that 
are correctly predicted by the model is 77.36% and the expected percentage of observations 
correctly predicted by the model is 70.60%. The likelihood ratio test (LR test) with  𝜒𝜒2(12)=215.45 
rejects the null hypothesis that all the parameter estimates of the model jointly equals zero and 
confirms the model as a whole is significant at 1% level. Marginal effects are reported only for 
continuous variables since they may not be meaningful for discrete variables (Greene, 2003, p. 
668). 
Table 4.8 shows the significant effect of gender, age, education, demanded size of loan, size of 
farm land, labour ratio, off-farm labour, poor certificate and one geography dummy variable 
(THUYTHANH) on the household’s likelihood of being credit constrained.  
All three characteristics of household head have significant effects on the household’s credit 
constraint condition. The significantly negative effect of age on the household’s credit constraint 
status at 1% level indicates that household heads who are older than 55 have lower propensity of 
being credit constrained. This may be due to the fact that older farmers often accumulate enough 
capital and they are less likely to invest in new projects. The result is supported by findings of 
Barslund and Tarp (2008) and Freeman et al. (1998) where older farmers are more creditworthy 
and less dependent on credit to finance their production. The odds ratio of 0.31 implies that the 
odds that the households with household head older than 55 years old are credit constrained is 
3.23 times (1/0.31) lower than households with household head younger than 55 years old.   
However, contrary to Barslund and Tarp’s (2008) study, our result indicates that female-headed 
households are more likely to be credit constrained than their male counterparts. It should be 
noted that Barslund and Tarp’s study only covers loan rejected households, not partially 
constrained borrowers and constrained non-borrowers. In other words, the result from Barslund 
and Tarp’s (2008) study is only able to confirm that female applicants’ request for loan are more 
likely to be approved by formal financial institutions, which does not mean that they are likely to 
obtain sufficient credit. In addition, in Barslund and Tarp’s study, the respondents who are 
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 responsible for applying for credit are not necessarily the household heads. The odds ratio of 0.46 
implies that the odds that female-headed households are credit constrained is 2.17 times (1/0.46) 
higher than their male counterparts (see Table 4.8). 
Table 4.8 Logit model for credit constraint determinants 
 
Note: ** and* denotes significance at 1% and 5% level respectively; figure in parenthesis are t-
ratios; PCP is percentage correctly predicted; EPCP is expected percent correctly predicted. 
The effect of education on the household’s likelihood to be credit constrained is significant at 5% 
level with the expected sign (see Table 4.8). The finding is consistent with the studies of Barslund 
and Tarp (2008), Pham and Izumida (2002) and Jia et al. (2010). Barslund and Tarp (2008) explain 
that households with more education are capable of making better investment decision, thus, they 
Variable Coefficient Odd 
Ratios 
Marginal 
effect 
GENDER -0.775 0.46  
 (2.56)*   
AGE -1.160 0.31  
   (3.04)**   
EDU -0.590 0.55  
   (1.99)*   
DEMANDDUM 2.316 10.13  
     (8.47)**   
LANDSIZE -0.072 0.93 -0.016 
    (2.27)*   
INRATIO -0.207 0.81 -0.046 
    (2.18)*   
LARATIO -1.886 0.15 -0.426 
     (2.59)**   
OFFFARM -0.627 0.53 -0.141 
    (3.03)**   
POOR 0.753 2.12  
   (2.30)*   
VANTHANH 0.444 1.55  
 (1.29)   
THACHTIEN 0.231 1.26  
 (0.60)   
THUYTHANH 0.888 2.43  
   (2.17)*   
Constant 1.599 4.95  
   (2.54)*   
    
Number of observation    477 
Likelihood ratio                  215.45** 
Pseudo R2                            0.3347    
PCP                                       77.36 
EPCP                                     70.60 
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 are less likely to be rationed by formal financial institutions. It is supported by Pham and Izumida 
(2002) that educated individuals are generally respected and trusted by the society, therefore, 
they are considered to be more creditworthy than the less educated counterparts. Similarly, Jia et 
al. (2010) reveal that education of household heads can be an indicator of household human 
capital which plays an important role in relaxing credit constraints in China. The odd ratio of 0.55 
indicates that the odds that the household heads who completed high school or higher are credit 
constrained is 1.82 (1/0.55) times lower than those who only completed secondary or primary 
school.  
The influence of human capital on the likelihood of being credit constrained is confirmed by the 
significant effect of labour ratio and the number of off-farm labours on the household’s credit 
constraint condition. The result is consistent with Petrick’s (2004b) study, which indicates that 
households having more income earners are more likely to receive sufficient loans. The marginal 
effect of LARARIO is -0.426 implies that at the mean value, if the labour ratio increases by 10%, the 
household’s likelihood to be constrained decreases by 4.26% (see Table 4.8). In addition, the 
household with more non-farm labours have lower propensity to be credit constrained. Based on 
the marginal effect at the mean value, an addition off-farm labour can reduce the probability that 
the farm households were credit constrained by 14.1%. The presence of off-farm labours can be a 
proxy of positive non-farm income which can substitute for credit to purchase agricultural input 
(Stampini and Davis (2009)).  
The effect of farm land area is negative and significant at 5% level, indicating that the households 
possessing larger farm land size had more advantages to approach formal credit. The finding 
contradicts the results reported by  Boucher et al. (2009) where farm size have positive 
relationship with the likelihood of being credit constrained. According to Boucher et al., 
households cultivating in larger area of land have to cover relatively higher input cost, therefore 
they are more likely to depend on credit and fall into the credit constrained group. However, our 
finding supports Reyes’s (2011) study who reveals that the households possessing more land is 
evaluated to be more creditworthy. Thus, the impact of farm land size on the household’s 
propensity to be credit constrained is determined by the magnitude effect on the demand side 
and supply side. It is important to emphasise that in Vietnam, farm land is an indicator for 
production capacity rather than being treated as collateral.   
Table 4.8 also shows that the negative relationship between the ratio of non-farm income to farm 
income and the propensity to be credit constrained is statistically significant at 1% level. This 
implies that the more the family depends on farm income, the more likely they are credit 
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 constrained. This finding supports Stampini and Davis’s (2009) result which reveals that non-
agricultural income reduces the dependence of the households on credit, thus, relax credit 
constraints in rural Vietnam. Furthermore, according to Reardon et al. (1998), similar to credit, 
non-farm income ensures that the household consumption is not affected by the fluctuation of 
farm income.  
In terms of geography variables, the results show that only THUYTHANH is significantly different 
from the reference location. Table 4.4 shows the poverty rate of THUYTHANH is much lower than 
other communes. This means the households living in the communes with low poverty rate find it 
more difficult to access formal credit. It is understandable since disadvantaged areas are often 
prioritised by subsidised credit institutions.  
Although the poor is considered to be the target group of subsidised credit, the result described in 
Table 4.8 reveals that they are more likely to be credit constrained than non-poor households. The 
odds ratio of 2.12 indicates that the odds that the poor households are rationed is 2.12 times 
higher than their non-poor counterparts. This supports the findings of Nguyen (2008) who 
postulates that poor households are more likely to be excluded by formal financial institutions. 
According to the policy of Vietnam Bank for Social and Policies, households who are certified to be 
poor by the commune authority are prioritised to borrow from the bank but they cannot borrow 
more than 30 million VND. Vietnam Bank for Social and Policies is the only bank willing to lend to 
the poor. Thus, the maximum amount the poor can borrow from the formal sector is only 30 
million VND. It is worth noting that the poor considered in our study are those certified by the 
authority, which does not necessarily follow the World Bank’s definition as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Therefore, the result should be interpreted with caution and cannot be concluded for the poor in 
general but only for the certified poor households. 
We add a demand dummy variable which is equal to 1 for households that need to borrow more 
than 30 million VND and 0 otherwise to test whether the limitation of loan size at 30 million VND 
set by the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies can meet the farm household’s demand for credit. The 
significantly negative relationship between this variable and credit constraint status (at 1% level) 
reveals that subsidised credit only satisfy partially the farm household’s demand for credit. In 
addition, if the household demand exceeds 30 million VND, their odds of being credit constrained 
is 10.13 times higher than those whose demand is lower than 30 million VND (see Table 4.8). 
The marginal effects presented in Table 4.8 reveal that among the factors affecting the household 
credit constraint condition, human resources may be the most important determinants since 
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 labour ratio and number of off-farm labours have strongest marginal effects on the probability of 
being credit constrained while the marginal effects of farm land size and income ratio are modest.   
In conclusion, the results obtained from the logit model confirm the influence of physical capital, 
human capital, economic related factor and geography related factors on the household credit 
constraint status. The loan size limit set by Vietnam Bank for Social and Policies is a major obstacle 
for the households to obtain sufficient credit. For the poor, although they are prioritised by the 
credit subsidy policy, the results show that they are more likely to be credit constrained.   
4.2.2 Impact of credit constraints on household welfare   
4.2.2.1 Definitions of the explanatory variables used in the Endogenous Switching 
Regression model  
The estimation of the ESR model for credit constraint impact evaluation follows two stages. In the 
first stage, we estimate equation (3.2) using the probit method. Inverse Mills ratios are calculated 
from the probit model and added to equation (3.10-1) and (3.10-2). In the second stage, we 
estimate equation (3.10-1) and (3.10-2) by weighted least squares method.  
The dependent and independent variables of the probit model are similar to the logit model 
discussed above. The dependent variable in equation (3.10-1) and (3.10-2) is consumption per 
capita in logarithm form as the form fits the data better in the consumption function (Campbell & 
Deaton, 1989). All the explanatory variables of the probit model are the independent variables in 
equation (3.10-1) and (3.10-2) except for DEMANDDUM treated as the exclusion restriction. The 
reason we choose DEMANDDUM to be the exclusion restriction is because it can satisfy two 
conditions: it is strongly associated with the household likelihood to be credit constrained and it 
does not affect actual household consumption expenditure. The first condition is proven by the 
significant relationship between the credit amount the households demanded and their likelihood 
to be credit constrained (see Table 4.8). Further, comparing the likelihood ratio of the probit 
model with and without DEMANDDUM variable we realise the likelihood ratio of the probit model 
with the presence of the DEMANDDUM is higher than the model without DEMANDDUM (217.12 
versus 129.39) (details of the estimations are reported in Appendix A-4). This means 
DEMANDDUM is an important independent variable in the probit model. For the second condition, 
it is rational to believe that the amount of credit a household demand for does not affect their 
actual consumption expenditure. However, we do not have specific test for the second condition 
(test for exogeneity).  
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 Table 4.9 Descriptive statistics of variables of Endogenous Switching Regression model 
Source: Author’s survey data, 2013 
Apart from the independent variables used in the probit model, two explanatory variables children 
tertiary study (CHILDSTU) and number of household members (HH_SIZE) are added to the 
consumption function of  both credit constrained and unconstrained households (equation (3.10-
1) and (3.10-2)). In rural Vietnam, tertiary education expense accounts for a substantial proportion 
of the household consumption. Thus, households having child/children studying at tertiary schools 
are expected to incur higher education expenditure. The number of household member variable 
controls for the difference in household size. Further, we add a dummy variable INFORMAL, which 
Variables Description Mean S.D. Min Max 
CONSTRAINED 1 if household is credit constrained,  
0 = unconstrained 
0.40 0.49 0 1 
CON_PER Household’s consumption per capita 
(Million VND) 
10.60 3.07 3.6 25.5 
GENDER 1 if household head is male,  
0 = female 
0.79 0.40 0 1 
AGE 1 if household head is older than 55,  
0 = otherwise 
0.19 0.39 0 1 
EDU 1 if household head gets high school 
degree or higher, 0 = otherwise 
0.24 0.42 0 1 
DEMANDDUM 1 if the amount of loan household 
needed to borrow is larger than  30 
million VND, 0 = otherwise 
0.41 0.49 0 1 
LANDSIZE Size of household farm land (1000m2) 3.63 2.69 0.35 20 
INRATIO Ratio of non-farm income to farm 
income 
1.99 2.34 0 18 
LARATIO Ratio of labour to total family members 0.55 0.19 0.25 1 
OFFFARM Number of off-farm labours 1.27 0.83 0 5 
POOR 1 if household has poor certificate,  
0 = otherwise 
0.20 0.40 0 1 
HH_SIZE Household size 4.41 1.31 2 9 
CHILDSTU 1 if household has child/children being 
tertiary student, 0 = otherwise 
0.28 0.45 0 1 
INFORMAL 1 if household gets insufficient credit 
from informal source, 0 = otherwise 
0.22 0.41 0 1 
VANTHANH Geography dummy variable 0.25 0.43 0 1 
THACHTIEN Geography dummy variable 0.25 0.43 0 1 
THUYTHANH Geography dummy variable 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Total number of observations  477     
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 is equal to 0 if the household received sufficient amount of credit from the informal sector, 
otherwise 1, to the consumption function of credit constrained households (equation (3.10-1)). 
The purpose of adding this dummy variable is to examine the importance of informal credit to 
household welfare in case they are credit constrained by the formal financial institutions. The 
descriptive statistics of the model are presented in Table 4.9.  
4.2.2.2 Impact of credit constraints on household welfare   
The results obtained from the first stage (probit model) is presented in Appendix A-4. In general, 
the estimated parameters and the statistical significance of the explanatory variables from the 
probit model are similar to the results obtained from the logit model.  The results from the second 
stage (weighted least squares models) are summarised in Table 4.10. In addition, we also present 
the output of OLS estimations to compare the results from the models with and without treating 
selection bias.   
The Wald test reported in Table 4.10 confirms the significance of all regressors except the constant 
term. The likelihood ratio test (LR test) with   𝜒𝜒2(2) = 5.04 which is significant at 10% level 
indicates that the endogenous switching model is better than the exogenous model. The 
significance of 𝜌𝜌1 implies that the sample may suffer from selection bias and OLS estimation would 
result in biased estimates. Since 𝜌𝜌1 is negative and significant at 1% level, we can conclude that 
the credit constrained households have lower consumption per capita than a random household. 
The positive sign of 𝜌𝜌0 suggests that the credit unconstrained households have higher 
consumption per capita than a random household, however the coefficient is insignificant and 
thus inconclusive. Our findings are supported by the Li and Zhi’s (2010) and Li et al.’s (2013) 
studies which reveal that credit constraints have detrimental effect on household consumption 
expenditure. Similarly, Baiyegunhi et al. (2010) argue that credit constrained households have 
lower monthly per adult consumption expenditure than credit unconstrained counterparts. Some 
studies that use income as the proxy of household welfare share similar conclusion (Dong et al., 
2010; Li & Zhi, 2010). Therefore, regardless of the indicators used to measure household welfare, 
the literature confirms the detrimental effect of credit constraints on rural farm household 
welfare.   
The predictors of consumption per capita are similar to the case of credit unconstrained and 
constrained households in terms of significance and sign except for the variable INFORMAL 
appearing only in the consumption equation (3.10-1) of the credit constrained households. The 
negative significant effect of this variable on consumption per capita implies that the credit 
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 constrained households who received sufficient amount of credit from informal sources can 
improve their consumption per capita by 8.4% (see Table 4.10).  
Table 4.10 Impact of credit constraints on the household consumption per capita 
Variable name 
Endogenous switching model  OLS 
Credit 
unconstrained 
Credit 
constrained 
 Credit 
unconstrained 
Credit 
constrained 
POOR -0.134 -0.174  -0.138 -0.152 
   (3.84)***  (6.16)***  (3.71)*** (5.18)*** 
LANDSIZE 0.016 0.019  0.016 0.014 
   (4.20)***  (2.60)***  (3.92)*** (1.91)* 
HH_SIZE -0.104 -0.133  -0.104 -0.127 
      (10.21)***   (10.99)***  (9.80)*** (9.70)*** 
LARATIO 0.289 0.271  0.293 0.252 
     (4.59)*** (3.03)***  (4.66)*** (2.29)** 
INRATIO 0.011 0.020  0.011 0.010 
 (2.38) ** (1.32)  (2.22)** (0.76) 
GENDER -0.025 0.043  -0.020 0.031 
 (0.76) (1.59)  (0.68) (1.09) 
AGE -0.011 -0.030  -0.009 -0.069 
 (0.47) (0.70)  (0.37) (0.91) 
EDU  0.031 0.018  0.033 0.014 
 (1.38) (0.60)  (1.56) (0.64) 
CHILDSTU  0.132 0.245  0.131 0.242 
      (6.12)*** (8.96)***  (5.67)*** (7.05)*** 
OFFFARM  0.088 0.125  0.089 0.117 
      (5.48)***   (5.28)***  (4.83)*** (4.91)*** 
VANTHANH 0.079 -0.015  0.078 -0.003 
 (2.52) ** (0.42)  (2.26)** (0.10) 
THACHTIEN 0.063 0.070  0.063 0.076 
 (2.18)** (1.65)  (1.91)* (2.20)** 
THUYTHANH 0.066 -0.024  0.066 -0.036 
 (2.43)** (0.60)  (2.12)** (0.53) 
INFORMAL  -0.084   -0.085 
    (3.63)***   (2.88)*** 
Constant 2.415 2.508  2.398 2.473 
        (28.47)***   (27.01)***  (35.45)*** (26.81)*** 
𝜎𝜎0𝜀𝜀    0.150      (23.44)***    
𝜎𝜎1𝜀𝜀   0.158      (12.85)***    
𝜌𝜌0   0.0892      (0.315)    
𝜌𝜌1   -0.617     (3.53)***    
Log likelihood    24.58    
Wald test   441.84***    
LR test   𝜒𝜒2(2) =5.04*  (p = 0.08)    
Note:; ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively; figures in parenthesis are 
t-ratios; 𝜎𝜎0𝜀𝜀 and 𝜎𝜎1𝜀𝜀 are the square root of the variances of the residuals of consumption per capita 
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 models; 𝜌𝜌0 and 𝜌𝜌1 are correlation between the error terms of credit constraint condition equation and 
equations of consumption per capita of credit unconstrained households and constrained households, 
respectively. Following the suggestion of Long and Ervin (2000), estimations of OLS model applied HC3 
option by STATA to solve heteroskedasticity issue.  
Table 4.10 also shows the difference in the significance of income ratio and geography variables 
between the consumption equations of the credit constrained and unconstrained households. The 
insignificant effect of the income ratio variable on consumption per capita of credit constrained 
households implies that for credit constrained families, the role of non-farm income in improving 
household welfare is negligible. This could be due to the lack of credit, income generated from 
non-farm activities becomes unstable, thus, is unable to improve their household consumption. 
Regarding the geography variables, the significance of the three dummy variables in the credit 
unconstrained household consumption equation reflects the deviation in living standard between 
THANHYEN and the three remaining locations. However, there is no difference among the 
consumption per capita of the credit constrained households in THANHYEN and other locations. 
The lack of credit may be the reason that prevents the households from utilising location 
advantages.  
Noticeably, an addition member in the credit constrained households reduces consumption per 
capita by 13.3% compared to 10.4% in the credit unconstrained households. Children’s tertiary 
expenditure is also a big burden for the credit constrained households than the credit 
unconstrained households. The presence of children studying at tertiary level increases the 
consumption per capita of the credit constrained households by 24.5%, but only 13.2% in the case 
of credit unconstrained households (see Table 4.10).  
Consumption per capita of the poor households is lower than their non-poor counterparts in the 
credit constrained group by 17.4% while the difference in consumption per capita between the 
poor and non-poor households in the credit unconstrained group is only 13.4% (see Table 4.10). In 
other words, sufficient credit contributes to narrow the welfare gaps between the poor and non-
poor households. The result can be explained by Phan (2012) finding that the impact of subsidised 
credit on poor household welfare is larger than on non-poor household welfare.     
In Table 4.10 we also present the results obtained from OLS estimations which show minor 
differences from the ESR model results. The difference between the two models is the deviations 
of coefficients between the credit constrained and unconstrained groups in the ESR model are 
larger than those in the OLS model. For example, the difference between the POOR coefficients in 
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 the consumption function of the credit constrained households and unconstrained households 
obtained from the ESR model is 0.04 (-0.134 versus -0.174) compared to 0.014 in the OLS model    
(-0.138 versus -0.152).  
In summary, the estimation results from the ESR model indicate the impact of credit constraints on 
the rural farm household welfare. Credit constraints are found to impede the households to 
employ the location advantages and non-farm income to improve their consumption. In addition, 
the results reveal the credit constrained households financially stressed when their families have 
an addition member or children studying at tertiary school. The results also indicate that the poor 
households can narrow their consumption gap with their non-poor counterparts if they are 
provided with sufficient credit.  
4.3 Chapter Summary  
The first section of the chapter provides an overview of the household credit constraint status in 
the surveyed area as well as the profiles of the credit constrained and unconstrained households. 
Further, the section describes the characteristics of formal and informal credit in the rural credit 
market. The second section presents the empirical results from the logit and ESR models.  
From our survey, 40.5% of the 479 households were identified to be credit constrained, in which 
majority of them was quantity constrained, and 40 households were transaction cost constrained. 
No risk constrained case was detected. Among the quantity constrained households, 53 
households were rejected by the formal credit institutions, 89 households received loans but with 
insufficient amount. By comparing the profiles of the two household groups, we recognise that the 
female-headed households are more likely to belong to the credit constrained group. On average, 
the head of credit constrained households are younger and attained lower level of education than 
the head of the credit unconstrained group. In addition, the credit unconstrained group possessed 
larger farm land area, had more income earners and off-farm labours. They had less children and 
were more likely to be engaged in off-farm income-generating activities. Moreover, the credit 
unconstrained group had higher average income and consumptions. The households living in 
different geography location are expected to have different propensity of being credit constrained.  
The rural credit market is characterised with differences between formal and informal credit. 
Formal financial institutions are more likely to provide larger loan size, lower interest rate with 
longer duration. However, formal credit is associated with longer processing time and rigid 
payment schedule. The households tend to use credit to invest in agricultural production and small 
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 investment/trade. Besides, the households are more likely to borrow from the informal sector to 
pay other loans while spend formal credit on their children education.  
The logit model is applied to identify the factors influencing the household credit constraint status. 
The results from the model indicate that the household likelihood to be constrained in the 
surveyed area is determined by gender, age and education of the household head, physical capital, 
human capital, income generating activities and geography location. Female-headed households 
are more likely to be rationed by the formal creditors. The households with young and less 
educated household heads share the same status. Farm land size, labour resources and non-farm 
income play a determining role to relax the household credit constraint status. The findings also 
raise the concern that the allocation of subsidised credit favours better off households but farm 
households in lower poverty rate areas have disadvantages to obtain subsidised credit. The 
maximum loan size offered by the formal financial institutions is still lower than the household 
actual demand. 
Empirical evidences also suggest the impact of credit constraints on rural farm household welfare. 
The credit constrained households have significantly lower consumption per capita than their 
unconstrained counterparts. Another disadvantage faced by the credit constrained households is 
that they are unable to utilise location advantage and non-farm income to enhance their welfare. 
The ESR model uncovers the financial burden encountered by the farm households when they are 
credit constrained. Credit constraints seriously affect the poor household consumption, widening 
the welfare gap between them and their non-poor counterparts.  
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 Chapter 5 
Conclusions  
The summary of the study is presented in this Chapter. Sections 5.1 summarises the major findings 
of the study. Section 5.2 discusses the implications of the study and Section 5.3 identifies the 
limitations and proposes recommendations for future studies. 
5.1 Major findings  
Since credit plays a vital role in enhancing rural farm household production and consumption, the 
government support is necessary for rural farm households to access formal credit through 
subsidised financial institutions. In spite of the presence of subsidised banks and funds in almost 
every communes, Vietnam rural farm households are still reported to be credit constrained. In this 
study, we aim to identify the determinants of credit constraint status of rural farm households and 
evaluate the impact of credit constraints on household welfare.  
Our study confirms that credit is a vital external financial resource for rural farm households in 
Vietnam and formal financial institutions are primary credit providers in the rural credit market. 
However, 40.5% of the farm households were still credit constrained. Majority of the households 
were quantity constrained, only 8.35% were transaction cost constrained. No household was 
found to be risk constrained. The studies of Boucher et al. (2009), Gershon et al. (1990) and Reyes 
(2011) also reveal that farm households are more likely to be quantity constrained than 
transaction cost or risk constrained. The reason farm households in Vietnam are less likely to be 
risk constrained is because of weak contract enforcement. Among the quantity constrained 
households, most of them were partly quantity constrained, which means their loan application 
was approved by the banks but the amount of credit they received was insufficient.  
Our study also identifies that the credit constraint condition of the rural farm households is 
significantly associated with household head characteristics, household characteristics and 
geography related factors. The households with female head are more likely to be credit 
constrained than the male-headed households. It may be because males are more likely to be self-
financed than their female counterparts. In addition, household age and education also determine 
the credit constraint status of the farm households. The households with young and less educated 
household heads have higher probability of being credit constrained since they are less 
creditworthy and more dependent on credit. 
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 The household characteristics determining the household credit constraint status includes 
agricultural land size, income ratio, labour ratio and off-farm labours. The results indicate that the 
households with larger agricultural land size are less likely to be credit constrained by formal 
financial institutions since agricultural land represents the household production capacity. The 
negative relationship between labour variables and the household credit constraint status implies 
that the households with human capital advantages (for example, number of labours, off-farm 
labours, and household education) have lower propensity of being credit constrained. Further, 
non-farm income also contributes to relax credit constraints on the rural farm households since it 
reduces the household dependence on credit to invest in agricultural input.   
Households living in different geographical locations may have different probability of being credit 
constrained. The households living in lower poverty rate communes are found to have higher 
propensity to be credit constrained as high poverty rate areas are given more attention from 
subsidised financial institutions. However, this does not imply that the poor households are more 
likely to receive sufficient credit. In fact, on the contrary, our findings indicate that the poor are 
more likely to be credit constrained. Subsidised credit is the only financial source accessible to the 
poor since they are considered to be less creditworthy by other creditors. However, subsidised 
credit providers always set credit limit on the poor. As a result, the poor who have credit demand 
exceeding the credit limit find themselves credit constrained. In this study we also examine 
whether the credit limit at 30 million VND set by Vietnam Bank for Social Policies can satisfy farm 
household credit demand. The result reveals that the households demanding for more than 30 
million VND are more likely to be constrained. This implies that the credit limit set by the bank is 
lower than actual credit demand of the farm households.   
Our result shows credit constraints negatively impact on household welfare. The credit 
constrained households have significantly lower consumption per capita than the credit 
unconstrained counterparts. Further, due to credit constraints, the farm households cannot 
employ the local advantages (for example, land and distance to the market), and non-farm income 
to improve their consumption. The credit constrained households are also under financial stress 
when they have an additional member or child/children pursuing tertiary study. The poor can 
narrow the welfare gap with non-poor households if they are provided with sufficient credit. 
Paradoxically, they are more likely to be credit restricted by formal financial institutions. In 
addition, our study identifies that the welfare of the credit constrained households would be 
improved if they can access informal credit to supplement the shortage of formal credit. Thus, 
informal credit can be a substitute for formal credit. Compared to formal creditors, informal 
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 lenders offer flexible repayment schedule, shorter loan processing time, however, charge 
considerably higher interest rate. Informal loan is also characterised by smaller loan size and short 
term duration.    
5.2 Implications of the Study 
5.2.1 Academic Implications  
Studies on credit constraints should consider both binding and non-binding constraints. The 
literature has shown that focusing only on binding constraint may result in underestimating credit 
demand and credit constraint condition of rural farm households (Boucher et al., 2009). In term of 
binding constraint, some studies assume households whose loan application is accepted by 
creditors are credit unconstrained, however, majority of the credit constrained households in our 
study received credit from formal financial institutions but with insufficient amount. The results 
suggest that credit constraints can occur even when households can access credit. With regards to 
non-binding constraint, it is difficult to distinguish between households with and without credit 
demand in the non-borrower group. The only way to detect credit constrained households in this 
group is to question whether they had demand for credit and if they had, why they did not apply 
for the loan.  
The design of Direct Elicitation Method is to assure that researchers can identify all types of credit 
constraints discussed above. As recommended by Gilligan et al. (2005), the effectiveness of DEM is 
determined by the quality of the questions. However, DEM users must acknowledge that DEM is 
unable to detect between the effective and ineffective credit constraints. If applicable, this 
method should be used in parallel with other methods such as static household models to 
evaluate the effectiveness of credit constraints since effective and ineffective credit constraints 
contain different implications.  
Results from the Endogenous Switching Regression model suggest studies on credit constraints 
and their impact may encounter selection bias. This implies that the use of household welfare 
indicators such as expenditure or income as explanatory variables for the household credit 
constraint status may results in bias estimations since there may be causal mutual relationship 
between the explanatory and dependent variables. Furthermore, impact evaluation models should 
be designed to test and solve the selection bias problem.    
5.2.2 Policy implications  
While the impact of subsidised credit on Vietnam rural household welfare has been confirmed by a 
 69 
 number of studies (see Nguyen (2008), Nghiem et al. (2012)  and Phan (2012)), how preferential 
credit is allocated is given a paucity of attention. Studies on formal credit constraints on rural farm 
households identify who are more likely to benefit from the credit subsidy program. In addition, 
different from accessibility approach, credit constraint approach not only examines whether 
formal credit is accessible to rural households but also measure the extent this source of finance 
satisfies their demand.  
Results from this study indicate that disadvantaged households (female, small size farmers, the 
poor) remain constrained by formal financial institutions in spite of the fact that they are the 
target groups of subsidised credit institutions. In other words, subsidised credit designed to 
support needy households may end up benefiting better-off groups as criticised by Braverman and 
Guasch (1986), Gonzalez-Vega (1984) and Burgess and Pande (2005). This raises the concern that 
preferential credit may exacerbate welfare inequality in the rural area, which is contradictory to 
Vietnamese government’s desire. In addition, as discussed by Hoff and Stiglitz (1998) and Bose 
(1998), apart from creating excessive demand, cheap formal credit may lead to the increase in 
interest rate charged by informal lenders since some of money lenders will exit the market 
because the pool of borrowers left are riskier than the conventional pool. As a result, credit 
constrained households may suffer from the adverse effect of cheap credit since they are forced to 
borrow from informal lenders.   
The government should be aware of and have solutions to relax credit constraints for rural farm 
households, otherwise, the credit subsidy policy would bring about unexpected consequences 
regardless the effort to improve the household’s accessibility to formal credit. Further, if farm 
households cannot access sufficient credit, loan efficiency would be reduced. Our results 
recommend that it is necessary to enhance the credit allocation regime to reduce the transaction 
cost and provide target households with sufficient credit. It should be emphasised that high 
transaction cost and the mismatch between credit demand and supply stem from information 
asymmetry. The government can help formal financial institutions to reduce information cost by 
encouraging the active role of social organisations such as Women Unions, Youth Unions and 
Veteran Unions in bridging rural farm households with formal lenders. Another government 
intervention to facilitate rural credit market is to create a market for agricultural land so that 
households can use agricultural land as a collateral. (Hoff & Stiglitz, 1990; Meyer & Nagarajan, 
2000; Seibel, 1997) 
It is also important that policy makers and formal credit institutions pay more attention to develop 
relevant credit policy for the poor and disadvantaged households in lower poverty rate 
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 communities to assure that they can receive sufficient loan for production and consumption. 
Relaxing credit constraints is essential not only to enhance household welfare but also narrow the 
welfare gap between the poor and non-poor households. The loan size limit set by Vietnam Bank 
for Social Policies may be a big obstacle for rural farm households to obtain sufficient credit. An 
understanding of the actual households’ credit demand to adjust the credit limit or apply more 
flexible policy would help the banks to relax the credit constraints on rural farm households (Pham 
& Izumida, 2002).   
Due to scarce resources, the government cannot address the credit constraint issue solely by 
providing credit to the targeted households. Investing in the households’ education and 
developing non-farm activities in rural areas are other solutions to mitigate the credit constraint 
issue. Results from our study suggest that households with strong human capital are less likely to 
be dependent on credit and more favoured by creditors. In addition, human capital is also a key 
factor to promote rural household welfare (Nguyen, Albrecht, Vroman, & Westbrook, 2007; Van 
de Walle & Cratty, 2004). Similarly, non-farm activities contribute to relax credit constraints and 
improve rural household welfare. Ellis (2000) and De Brauw and Harigaya (2007) reveal that farm 
households with diversified income sources are more able to encounter adverse incidents, thus, 
are less reliant on credit and have higher consumption expenditure.  
The substitute effect of informal credit on the household welfare supports the idea about the 
integration of two credit sectors into one well-functioning market as documented in Le (2011) and 
Phan, Gan, Nartea, and Cohen’s (2013) studies. Informal lenders have been conventionally 
criticised for charging monopoly interest rate and trapping rural households into indebted circle, 
however, recent studies suggest that informal lenders can overcome the weakness of formal credit 
such as low transaction cost and effective credit allocation. Therefore, the government should 
have relevant policies to regulate and direct the informal sector to serve the rural households 
effectively instead of attempting to diminish its operation (Ghate, 1992; Seibel, 1997).   
5.3 Limitations and Future Research 
A limitation of our study arises from the use of the Direct Elicitation Method to identify credit 
constrained households. As discussed in the study, the method cannot detect effective and 
ineffective credit constrained households. Our categorisation of the households into credit 
constrained and unconstrained groups is based on the households’ responses to the key questions 
whether they are satisfied with the amount of loan they received. However, we are unable to use 
static household models suggested by Petrick (2004b) to examine whether households are 
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 effectively credit constrained as most of the sample borrowers in our study obtained medium and 
long term loan from formal creditors. Further, 38.54% of the households used loan to pay their 
children’s tuition fees and the return of this investment is unmeasurable in the short term. 
Another limitation lies in the use of cross-sectional data which allows to detect credit constraints 
and measure their impact only in the short run. Further research is required to observe credit 
constraints and their impact in the long-run. Finally, the causes of credit constraints reported in 
our study are from the borrower’s views, while the lender’s view of credit constraints cannot be 
observed. However, it is worth noting that studies on credit constraints are rarely able to obtain 
lender’s opinions since banks must conform to the strict regulation of keeping their clients’ 
records confidential.  
This study only examines the credit constraint status of rural farm households and the impact on 
their consumption. Future research can address credit constraints on rural non-farm households 
and urban households since the credit subsidy program also expands its coverage to urban poor 
areas. Future research can explore in greater details the role of social networks (family, friends 
and relatives) in ameliorating formal credit constraints. The influence of social networks is direct 
or indirect through their impact on other factors such as the households’ human capital or 
livelihood diversification, which in turn contribute to relax credit constraints. Furthermore, 
resources from social networks (such as family, friends and relatives) may be the supplementary 
financial support for formal credit constrained households to secure their welfare.  
Future studies can also take into consideration the impact of credit constraints on the household’s 
productivity and other aspects of household welfare such as education and healthcare. Credit 
constraint status of rural farm households and their impact in the long run can be studied since 
they can offer important implications for the government policies on rural financial market in the 
long run. In addition, studies on credit constraints in long run are able to shed light on the inter-
linkages between the determinants of credit constraints such as the relationship between 
education and off-farm income, social capital and education, which are difficult to capture in the 
short run. In this study, we only surveyed the sources and purposes of the rural farm households’ 
credit, their borrowing behaviours such as how they recognise their need for credit, how they 
prioritise their activities and the first source of loan they seek for, require further investigation and 
analysis. This yields more insightful understanding of the rural credit market and generate more 
robust policies for the government to improve and develop the rural credit market.            
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 Appendix A-3 Test for Goodness of fit 
Number of observations         =  477 
Number of groups          =  10 
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(8)    =  9.58 
Prob > chi2                        =  0.2954 
 
Appendix A-4 Results from the first step of the Endogenous Regression switching model  
                                           (Probit model) 
Variable 
Model with 
DEMANDDUM 
Model without 
DEMANDDUM 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
GENDER -0.434       -2.48* -0.481        2.93** 
AGE -0.669  -3.07** -0.567     2.87** 
EDU -0.338         1.97* -0.267         1.71 
DEMANDDUM 1.382    8.87**   
LANDSIZE -0.087         2.37* -0.066          2.01* 
INRATIO -0.124         2.23* -0.125          2.46* 
LARATIO -1.132    2.68** -1.024        2.67** 
OFFFARM -0.358    3.07** -0.254      2.40* 
POOR 0.441         2.34* 0.435          2.52* 
VANTHANH 0.274         1.36 0.271          1.46 
THACHTIEN 0.150         0.68 -0.039          0.19 
THUYTHANH 0.531     2.25* -0.168    0.82 
Constant 1.599         2.54* 1.495        4.64** 
Number of obs 477 477 
Likelihood ratio 217.12** 129.39** 
Pseudo R2 0.3372    0.2010 
PCP 77.57 72.54 
EPCP 70.69 63.39 
Note: ** and* denotes significance at 1% and 5% level respectively; PCP is percentage correctly 
predicted; EPCP is expected percent correctly predicted. 
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 f. Inappropriate purpose [ ] 
g. Business too small [ ] 
h. The agricultural activity is risky [ ] 
i. Lack of accountability [ ] 
j. Others (please specify): _____________ [ ] 
Please go to Q1.9  
1.7. Did the total loan amount you received meet your needs? 
a. Yes  [ ]    b. No    [   ]  
 
If YES please go to the Section 2, NO please go to Q1.8. 
 
1.8. What were the reasons for the inadequate loan amount you applied for?  
    a. For the fear of rejection, requested amount was less than needed [ ] 
    b. Lack of collateral            [ ] 
    c. Lack of information           [ ] 
    d. The amount requested exceeded limitation set by the bank   [ ] 
    e. Currently in debt to banks  [ ] 
    f. High interest rates [ ] 
   g. Others (please specify): _________    [ ] 
1.9. What did you do when you didn’t receive the total loan amount requested from formal creditors? 
    a. Borrowed from informal sources  [  ] 
    b. Adjusted  my household expenditure          [   ] 
    c. Adjusted my  business plan            [  ] 
   d. Others (please specify): _________   [  ] 
Please go to Section 2     
 
1.10. Why didn’t you apply for credit from formal sources?  
a. Inadequate collateral [             ] 
b. Thought application would be rejected [             ] 
c. Fear of being in debt     [             ] 
d. Fear of losing collateral [             ] 
e. Have cheaper sources of credit [             ] 
f. Complicated government regulations  [             ] 
g. Administrative difficulties to process the application [             ] 
h. Interest rate was too high [             ] 
i. Ignorant of lending procedures [             ] 
j. Other  (please specify _______________________________) [             ] 
1.11. If you borrowed only from informal sources, did the total loan amount received meet your 
needs? 
  a. Yes           [      ]     b. No                     [   ]  
 
If YES please go to Section 2, NO please go to Q1.12 
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 1.12. What were reasons for the inadequate loan amount you applied for? 
   a. Exceed capacity of lenders [ ] 
   b. Lack of collateral            [ ] 
   c. For the fear of being unable to repay, requested amount was less than needed    [ ] 
   f. High interest rates [ ] 
   g. Others (please specify): _________    [ ] 
 
Section 2.  Borrowing behaviour of Household (from formal or/and informal credit sources) 
 
 
In questions 2.1 to 2.10, we would like to know about the characteristics of your loans in 2012 
from each source of credit. Please tick in brackets or fill in blanks corresponding to the 
appropriate source(s) you obtained the loan(s) from.  
 
2.1 How much did you borrow from each sources of credit in 2012? (Million VND) 
Formal ___________________ Million VND 
Informal__________________ Million VND 
        
2.2 What were the sources of your loans for the following 
activities?  
Formal Informal 
  
a. Production capital  [            ] [            ] 
b. Small investment/trade (non-farm)  [            ] [            ] 
c. Paying for children education expenses [            ] [            ] 
d. Emergencies (i.e. medical, wedding, burial)  [            ] [            ] 
e. Housing (i.e. repair, construction)  [            ] [            ] 
f. Purchasing durable assets (TV, machine)  [            ] [            ] 
g. Payment of other loans [            ] [            ] 
h. Others (please specify: ___________) [            ] [            ] 
 
2.3 What is the average interest rate per month charged by each sources of credit in 2012?  
Formal ___________________% 
Informal__________________ % 
 
2.4 What was the loan payment schedule for the largest loan in 2012? 
 Weekly Monthly  Semi - annually Annually Others 
Formal       
Informal      
 
2.5 For the largest loan, what was the loan duration?  
Formal ___________________ Months 
Informal__________________ Months 
 
2.6 What kinds of collateral did you use to obtain the loans? 
 Land certificate Asset Housing Equipment Capital Others 
Formal       
Informal      
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 2.7 What is the status of your loan(s) in 2011-2012? 
 Fully paid Current outstanding Past due Restructured Others 
Formal       
Informal      
 
2.8 How long did it take to process your loan for the credit providers you applied? 
 Within a 
day 
Less than 
a week 
1 week – less 
than 2 weeks 
2 week – less 
than 3 weeks 
3 week – 1 
month 
More than a 
month 
Formal        
Informal       
 
2.9 Were there any charge(s) on the formal loan(s)? 
a. Yes [ ]     b. No  [ ] 
If Yes please go to Q 2.10, No please go to Q 2.11 
 
2.10 If yes, what were these charges? (You can tick more than one) 
a. Administrative or service fee [            ] 
b. Insurance fee [            ] 
c. Guarantee fee [            ] 
d. Others, please specify____________________________________  
2.11 Did you receive any assistance (eg. from government, credit officials, business associations, 
acquaintances, etc.) in obtaining the loan? 
a. Yes [ ]     b. No [ ] 
 
2.12 What were the difficulties, if any, you faced when borrowing from formal lender(s)? 
a. Many steps in processing loan application  [            ] 
b. High administration fees      [            ] 
c. Unfriendly credit officers [            ] 
d. Being requested extra money for approval  [            ] 
e. High value of collateral [            ] 
f. Late provision of loan [            ] 
g. Inconsistence credit rules, laws, regulations [            ] 
h. Others (please specify): _________________ [            ] 
i. No difficulty [            ] 
 
2.13 Why did you obtain loan from informal creditors? 
a. Inadequate loans from formal credit [            ] 
b. Fast loan processing [            ] 
c. Flexible in term of payment schedule [            ] 
d. Lower interest rate  [            ] 
e. No collateral requirement [            ] 
f. Others (please specify): _________________ [            ] 
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Section 3.  Opinions on credit constraints and impact of credit constraints 
 
Below is a series of statements pertaining to your opinions towards impact of credit constraints. 
Please CIRCLE how strongly you disagree or agree with each of the following statements on a scale 
of 1 to 7. 1-you strongly disagree (SD), 7-you strongly agree (SA). 
 
 SD   Neutral   SA 
3.1. If I faced credit constraint, I would 
use less input than is required 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.2. If I faced credit constraint, I would 
downsize my cultivation area 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.3. If I faced credit constraint, I would 
not be able to provide a strong 
education for my children 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.4. If I faced credit constraint, I would 
not be able to provide adequate 
health care for family’s members 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.5. If I faced credit constraint, I would 
have to sell my asset to meet 
consumption demand 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.6. If I faced credit constraint, I would 
have to borrow from informal lenders 
at high interest rate 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3.7. If I could get adequate credit I would  
a. Leave agriculture and start a non-farm business 
b. Remain in agriculture and expand agricultural production 
c. Remain in agriculture and start a non-farm business 
d. Other (please specify) ________________________________________ 
 
3.8. If I could get adequate credit I could improve (You can tick more than one) 
a. My children’s education 
b. My family’s health 
c. My household consumption  
d. Other (please specify) ________________________________________ 
 
3.9. What is the maximum interest rate acceptable to you when you need a loan? 
_______________ (%) per month 
 
3.10. What is the optimal loan duration acceptable to you when you need a loan? 
a. 6 months    [ ] 
b. 1 year     [ ] 
c. 2 years     [ ] 
d. 3 years     [ ] 
e. 5 years or above   [ ] 
 
3.11. What is the optimal repayment period acceptable to you when you need a loan? 
a. 6 months    [ ] 
b. 1 year     [ ] 
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 c. Lump-sum repayment at maturity [ ] 
 
3.12. What are you willing to provide as collateral? (You can tick more than one) 
a. Consumer durables   [ ] 
b. Certificate of land use right  [ ] 
c. Livestock    [ ] 
d. Certificate of deposit   [ ] 
e. House     [ ] 
f. Other(s) please specify______________________ 
 
3.13. Do you have intention to borrow in the future? 
a. Yes [ ]     b. No [ ] 
 
3.14. The following factors may be important in choosing creditors, please circle the suitable 
number from 1 to 5 where 1 indicates “strongly disagree” and 5 indicates “strongly agree” 
 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly 
agree 
a. No collateral required 1 2 3 4 5 
b. Lower interest-rate 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Immediate loan release/faster processing 1 2 3 4 5 
d. Having borrowing relationship with the creditor 1 2 3 4 5 
e. No/less complicated lending procedure 1 2 3 4 5 
f. Better lending terms 1 2 3 4 5 
g. Others, please specify …………………………………… 1 2 3 4 5 
 
3.15. What types of rural credit providers are available in your area? 
Formal sources  Informal  
a. State owned commercial banks [ ] f. Non – governmental Organisation [ ] 
b. Private rural commercial banks [ ] g. Private money lender [ ] 
c. People Credit Fund [ ] h. Trade credit [ ] 
d. Bank for Social Policies  [ ] k. Relatives/ Friends [ ] 
e. Political and Social Organisations [ ] l. Other  
(please specify ____________________) 
[ ] 
 
Below is a series of statements pertaining your perceptions towards formal financial institutions. 
Please CIRCLE how strongly you disagree or agree with each of the following statements on a scale 
of 1 to 7. 1-you strongly disagree (SD), 7-you strongly agree (SA). 
 
 SD   Neutral   SA 
3.16. Formal financial institutions control 
loans not to be used for other 
purposes than those stated in the 
loan contract 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.17. The loan size from formal financial 
institutions does not satisfy farmers 
needs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 3.18. Female headed household 
borrowers are rejected by formal 
financial institutions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.19. The interest rates charged by formal 
financial institutions are competitive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.20. Formal lenders are too strict; they 
are not as flexible as informal ones 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.21. Formal lenders do not offer 
refinancing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.22. Formal lenders should simplify loan 
procedure  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.23. Formal lenders should be more 
flexible for urgent loans 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Section 4.  Household’s Demographics and Economic Activities 
  
 
4.1. Are you the household head?  
a.   Yes  [ ]   b.   No  [ ] 
 
4.2.  What is your gender? 
 a.   Male   [ ]   b.   Female  [ ] 
 
4.3. Which age group do you belong to? 
a. Below 25   [ ] 
b. 25-35    [ ] 
c. 36-45    [ ] 
d. 46-55    [ ] 
e. 56-65    [ ] 
f. Above 65   [ ] 
 
4.4. What is your marital status? 
a. Single/Never Married?  [ ] 
b. Married   [ ]     
c. De factor relationship  [ ] 
d. Divorced/separated  [ ] 
e. Widow    [ ] 
 
4.5. How many children do you have? __________ 
 
4.6. What is your highest level of education? 
a.  No education   [ ] 
b.  Primary school   [ ] 
c.  Middle school   [ ] 
d.  High school   [ ] 
e. Vocational training   [ ] 
f. College    [ ] 
g. Other(s) please specify______________________ 
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4.7. Was your household certified as the poor by the local authority in the following year? 
a. Yes  [ ]   Year 2011           Year 2012          (please circle the year) 
b. No  [ ] 
 
4.8. Which union(s), if any, did you belong to in 2011-2012? (You can tick more than one) 
a. Farmer Union   [ ] 
b. Woman Union   [ ] 
c. Veteran Union   [ ] 
d. Youth Union   [ ] 
e. None of them   [ ] 
 
4.9. Were you a member of People Credit Fund in 2011-2012? 
        a. Yes  [ ]    b.   No [ ] 
 
4.10.  What is your main occupation?  
a. Crop farmer   [ ] 
b. Livestock and poultry raiser [ ]   
c. Fisher folk   [ ] 
d. Trader    [ ] 
e. Governmental - sector worker [ ] 
f. Private sector worker  [ ] 
g. Other (please specify_________________) 
 
4.11. The number of people living in your household  (please state):___________persons 
 
4.12. The number of income earners in your household (please state):__________persons 
 
4.13. Do you have any child/children studying at tertiary schools?  
a.      Yes [ ]  
b.      No [ ] 
 
4.14. The number of people having off-farm income in your household (please 
state):_________persons 
 
4.15. What is the status of your land ownership? 
a. Owned my land   [ ] 
b. Leased land   [ ] 
c. I do not own or lease any land [ ]  Please go to Q4.17 
d. Other(s) please specify________________________ 
 
4.16. What is size of your household farm land?___________ha 
 
4.17. In 2012, did you receive any support from (You can tick more than one) 
a. Government    [ ] 
b. Cooperative    [ ] 
c. Non-governmental Organisation(s) [ ] 
d. Political and Social Organisation(s) [ ] 
e. None of them    [ ] 
 90 
  
4.18. What is the main source of your household income? 
a. Farming/cropping  [ ] 
b. Livestock   [ ] 
c. Fishery    [ ] 
d. Farm labourer   [ ] 
e. Non-farm labourer  [ ] 
f. Family business   [ ] 
g. Other(s) please specify  [ ] 
 
4.19. What was your household total annual income for the year 2012 
Sources of income Amount (VND) 
a. Farm  
b. Non - farm  
4.20. Did your household have any subsidiary income in the past 12 months? 
a. Yes [ ] please specify: __________________ VND  b. No [ ] 
If YES please go to Q4.21.  If NO please go to Q4.22 
 
4.21. What were sources of subsidiary household income? (You can tick more than one) 
a. Relief payment from government  [ ] 
b. Domestic remittances     [ ] 
c. Overseas remittances    [ ] 
d. Others_______________________ 
 
4.22. Do you have savings? 
a. Yes [ ]      b. No [ ] 
If YES please go to Q4.23.  If NO please go to Q4.24 
 
4.23. What are your total savings in 2012?   [ ] 
a. Less than VND 1 million     [ ] 
b. VND 1 million to VND 5 million    [ ] 
c. More than VND 5 million to VND 10 million  [ ] 
d. More than VND 10 million to VND 15 million  [ ] 
e. More than VND 15 million to VND 20 million  [ ] 
f. More than VND 20 million    [ ] 
 
4.24. Do you have deposit at any banks? 
a. Yes [ ] please specify name of the banks: ______________   
b. No [ ] 
 
4.25. What was your household annual consumption expenditure for the year 2012? 
________________Million VND 
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4.26.  What was your household annual farming expenditure for the year 2012? 
Expenditure Amount (VND)/Year 
a. Land rental  
b. Input for farming  
c. Feed expenditure for livestock  
d. Other  
Total  
 
4.27. Were there any adverse incidents (hospitalization, wedding, burial…) that affected your 
income or expenditure?  
a. Yes (please specify) ___________________________________________[ ] 
b. No          [ ]  
 
4.28. How long does it take you from your house to the nearest bank? 
_________________minutes 
 
 
Your participation in this survey is greatly appreciated. Thank you for your time and if you have 
further comments about credit card, please feel free to comment in the space provided below. Once 
again, we assure you that your identity will remain STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. 
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